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This document is a collection of essays On two different issues of interest in macroe-
conomics and international finance. The second chapter presents a study on the role
of sale-induced high frequency price fluctuations in monetary economics. The third
and fourth chapters focus on the phenomenon of currency substitution observed in
several developing countries and transition economies.
Chapter 2 is motivated by recent microeconomic price evidence that shows
that price promotions may have a significant bearing on the measured frequency
of price changes. This finding raises the question of whether micro price flexibility
caused by the presence of price promotions translates into macro neutrality to mon-
etary shocks. The issue is addressed by introducing price promotions in a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) environment where agents differ in their de-
1
gree of price sensitivity and face a time cost when looking for promotions. On the
production side, firms optimally choose their regular and promotional prices as well
as the frequency of promotions.
In this framework, regular and promotional prices coexist and promotions pro-
vide a new source of firm-level price flexibility. After introducing Calvo-stickiness
in regular prices, individual price series behave similarly to those reported in recent
empirical studies: regular prices are sticky; prices including promotions change very
frequently, and realized prices show rigidity in the form of inertial reference values
from which weekly prices temporarily deviate. In the aggregate, the economy dis-
plays near neutrality with respect to monetary shocks with a response of output
that, on impact, is equal to one third of the one obtained from a standard Calvo
model, a result that shows the importance of further exploration of firm-customer
interactions in macroeconomic models.
Chapter 2 is organized in five sections. The first one presents the introduction.
The model is developed in the second section. The solution method, parameters and
steady state values are discussed in the third section. The fourth section presents
results on the model’s micro price behavior and the macroeconomic implications
of price promotions, particularly on the responses to monetary shocks. The fifth
section concludes.
Chapter 3 studies the phenomenon of currency substitution; that is, the use
of foreign currency as a means of payment, as frequently observed in several devel-
oping countries and emerging economies. In several countries, currency substitution
increases with inflation during high inflation periods and reaches its peak once the
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economy has been stabilized, showing high persistence in the subsequent periods in
spite of the downward trend in inflation. The chapter focuses on two examples of
this particular phenomenon: Bolivia and Peru.
The chapter develops a perfect foresight two-currency model with exogenous
production and transaction costs that is used to generate persistence in currency
substitution. The model introduces ”dollarization capital” as a means to capture the
economy’s accumulated experience in using the foreign currency. When parameters
are set to replicate observed pre-hyperinflation ratios in the two selected economies,
the model is able to generate a low-inflation-high-substitution equilibrium consis-
tent with the post-stabilization behavior observed in various emerging markets and
developing countries. The dollarization capital model explains from 1/6 of the gap
between the observed currency substitution ratios and the ones generated by a model
with no dollarization capital dynamics. As a result of quick and sizable changes in
domestic currency real balances, the predicted post-stabilization currency substitu-
tion ratios adjust quickly in their path towards a low-inflation equilibrium, a finding
that suggests focusing future modeling efforts on exploring plausible mechanisms
that may introduce post-stabilization inertia in domestic currency holdings.
Chapter 3 is organized in five sections. After the introduction, the second
section describes the pre and post high-inflation pattern of currency substitution in
Bolivia and Peru. The theoretical model is presented in the third section and solved
in the fourth section. The fifth section concludes.
One of the limitations of the model analyzed in Chapter 3 is that it is not able
to generate an asymmetric relationship between inflation and currency substitution
3
before and after high inflation episodes. This behavior is at odds with the data in
several partially dollarized economies. Therefore, Chapter 4 explores a simple model
that generates non-linearities in the relationship between currency substitution and
inflation.
The chapter presents a simple three agent model with two consumers who can
differ in their distance, and therefore walking cost, from money exchange points
provided by the third agent, the financial sector, who is the only one that pos-
sesses the technology to exchange domestic for foreign currency. Money is used
for transaction purposes and agents have an incentive to hold foreign currency bal-
ances for high enough levels of inflation. The possibility of substitution, however,
depends on whether or not the financial sector pays a fixed cost necessary to install
money exchange points where consumers can buy currency exchange services. In
this environment, a sequence of episodes of high and moderate inflation may push
the financial sector into expanding the number of available money exchange points,
therefore permanently reducing the consumers’ cost of using the foreign currency
and decreasing the inflation threshold at which households are willing to substitute
foreign for domestic currency.
From a theoretical point of view, the work presented in Chapter 4 constitutes
an effort to provide a micro foundation for the emergence and functioning of network
externality effects that have been explored as a possible explanation for high levels
of currency substitution even after several years of low inflation.
Chapter 4 is organized in three sections. The first section presents the intro-
duction. The second section presents a simple three agent model used to study the
4
consumer’s optimal currency substitution behavior and the financial sector’s optimal
dollarization capital investment decision. The third section concludes.
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Chapter 2
A Monetary Model With Price Promotions
Recent microeconomic price evidence shows that price promotions may have a sig-
nificant bearing on the measured frequency of price changes, a finding that raises the
question of whether micro price flexibility translates into macro neutrality to mone-
tary shocks. This chapter addresses this issue by introducing price promotions in a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) environment where agents differ in
their degree of price sensitivity and face a time cost when looking for promotions.
On the production side, firms optimally choose their regular and promotional prices
as well as the frequency of promotions. Under this setting, regular and promotional
prices coexist and promotions provide a new source of firm-level price flexibility.
After introducing Calvo-stickiness in regular prices, individual price series behave
similarly to the ones reported in recent empirical studies: regular prices are sticky;
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prices including promotions change very frequently, and realized prices show rigid-
ity in the form of inertial reference values from which weekly prices temporarily
deviate. In the aggregate, the economy displays near neutrality with respect to
monetary shocks with a response of output that, on impact, is equal to one third of
the one obtained from a standard Calvo model, a result that shows the importance
of further exploration of firm-customer interactions in macroeconomic models.
The exercise of studying price promotions in a macroeconomic context is mo-
tivated by recent empirical work showing that the treatment of price sales may have
an important effect on the estimated frequency of individual price changes. An
example of this is the influential work of Bils and Klenow (2004), who analyzed
the frequency of price changes in different components of the US Consumer Price
Index (CPI), finding a median time between changes of 4.3 months. This estimate,
which includes sale related price changes, is well below previous ones obtained using
less comprehensive datasets. Given that the degree of price stickiness and, more
specifically, the probability of price changes is an important element for the quanti-
tative solution of New Keynesian models, the result has important implications for
macroeconomic modeling. For example, when discussing Michael Woodford’s Inter-
est and Prices, Green (2005) mentions that “at the very least [Bils and Klenow’s]
study shows a need to recalibrate Woodford’s model.” Indeed, Bils and Klenow’s
result has become a calibration reference used in well known DSGE studies such as
Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2005) and Golosov and Lucas (2007).
Following Bils and Klenow’s seminal work, recent research by Nakamura and
Steinsson (2008) and Klenow and Krystov (2008) uses a more detailed dataset (the
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US CPI Research Database) and finds that the estimated time between price changes
is sensitive to the inclusion of sale prices. Particularly, Nakamura and Steinsson find
median durations between 4.4 and 4.6 months when including sales, but between 8
and 11 months when excluding sales.
This new evidence on price setting has been complemented by recent studies
using higher frequency micro price datasets. Eichenbaum, Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2011) analyze a new weekly scanner dataset for a major US retailer, finding that
nominal rigidities take the form of inertia in reference prices with weekly prices
fluctuating around reference values that tend to remain constant over extended
periods of time. Klenow and Malin (2010) find that the reference price phenomenon
documented by Eichenbaum et. al. (2011) extends to most items in the non-shelter
CPI.1
These results suggest that promotional prices have a large impact on measures
of the frequency of price changes, but also point to the need to explore the potential
macroeconomic implications of price promotions.2 In the words of Klenow and
1The shelter component of the CPI is composed of the following items: (i) Rent of primary
residence, (ii) Lodging away from home, (iii) Housing at school (excluding board), (iv) Other
lodging away from home including hotels and motels, (v) Owners’ equivalent rent of primary
residence and (vi) Tenants’ and household insurance.
2This also seems to be the case outside the US. For example, Dhyne et. al. (2006) note
that the statistical treatment and report of sale prices may be an important factor in explaining
the observed differences in the frequency of price adjustment across euro-area countries. Cavallo
(2009), meanwhile, uses price scraped data for four Latin-American countries, finding that, in most
cases, measured price durations are considerably increased by the exclusion of sales. Data scraping
is the activity of extracting data from output intended for the screen or printer of a computer
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Krystov (2008), “sales are not . . . [just] a discount from the regular price; they have
a life of their own.” In relation to this point, Mackowiak and Smets’ (2008) survey
paper on micro price evidence presents some interesting comments on the macro-
modeling implications of sales in micro price data. First, an optimizing model of
sales will, in general, predict that the magnitude, frequency and duration of sales
respond to macroeconomic shocks. The practice of excluding all sale-related price
changes from macro models may therefore be unjustified. Second, sale-related price
changes in the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) dataset are at least as sensitive to
inflation as are regular price changes (Klenow and Willis, 2007). Third, even if price
promotions are caused by shocks orthogonal to the macroeconomy, the presence of
sales may matter for the response of prices to macroeconomic shocks.
The first papers that incorporate sale prices into a macro model are Kehoe
and Midrigan (2007, 2008). These papers modify the Golosov and Lucas (2007)
menu cost model by explicitly including a motive for sales, allowing firms to pay for
temporary price changes at a lower menu cost than that paid when changing their
price permanently. The authors then use their sales model as a data generating pro-
cess and evaluate the effects of fitting a simple Calvo model (with no sales motive
in it) in order to match the moments generated by the sales model. They consider
two cases: one including temporary price changes (i.e. sales) from the price series
generated by the benchmark sales model, and one excluding them. They find that
excluding sales overstates the real effects of monetary shocks by almost 70%, and
including sales produces only 1/9 of the real effects of monetary policy in the bench-
(human-readable output) rather than from original files or databases (www.pcmag.com).
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mark model. Kehoe and Midrigan’s exercise highlights the importance of explicitly
developing a motive for temporary price changes in monetary models.
More recently, Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011) and Kehoe and Midrigan (2010)
focus on whether sale-related and temporary price changes translate into macroeco-
nomic neutrality in a monetary DSGE environment. Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011)
develop a framework in which sale prices are not linked to the existence of menu
costs. They construct an environment with differentiated goods and differentiated
brands for each good, with consumers willing to substitute between brands for some
products, but not for others. Firms are not able to price discriminate between con-
sumers, and therefore choose to offer a regular price at some moments in time and
a sale price at others. If a Calvo-type rigidity is introduced in regular prices, the
model generates individual time series that behave similarly to those studied by
Eichenbaum et al. (2011). When studying the effects of monetary shocks, the au-
thors find that output impulse responses are very similar to those of a model with no
sales, implying that micro price flexibility does not translate into macro flexibility
and, therefore, sales are essentially irrelevant for monetary analysis. This result is
due to the fact that in their model, sales are strategic substitutes; that is, a firm’s
incentive to have a sale is decreasing in the number of other firms having a sale.
Continuing with their earlier work, Kehoe and Midrigan (2010) build an ex-
tension of the standard menu cost model adding features that make the predictions
of the modified environment consistent with the micro price data. In their model,
prices are subject to both permanent and temporary shocks; retailers set a list price
and a posted price and face two fixed costs: one when changing the list price, and
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another when the posted price temporarily differs from the listed one. In this envi-
ronment, firms tend to change list prices in order to offset permanent productivity
shocks and monetary shocks and temporarily deviate from the list price in order to
offset transitory shocks. Given the menu cost friction on list prices, firms may recur
to deviations from the listed price as a channel for offsetting transitory monetary
shocks. However, since these deviations are temporary, this only allow firms to react
temporarily to a monetary shock, so that economy presents a high degree of non
neutrality even in the presence of frequent temporary price changes. Kehoe and
Midrigan also show that this result does not arise from strategic interactions as in
Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011) but solely from the special nature of temporary price
changes in their model.
A common characteristic of Kehoe and Midrigan (2007, 2008, 2010) and
Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011) is that households have no choice over how often
they look for price promotions. Sales are therefore exogenous from the consumer’s
point of view. Letting consumers choose the time spent looking for price promotions
creates a new intratemporal margin that has important implications for the model’s
response to aggregate shocks. This is the line of work followed in this document.3
3Two other models that can deliver sticky regular prices with frequent sales are Nakamura and
Steinsson (2009) and Albrecht et. al. (2010). Nakamura and Steinsson develop a habit persistence
model where firms face a time inconsistency problem, having the incentive to promise low prices
in the present and raise them once that households have developed a consumption habit. In this
context, price stickiness can arise endogenously and optimally as a partial commitment device,
with firms choosing a price cap and discretionally setting prices only when they are below the cap.
Albrecht et. al. (2010), on the other hand, model shopping as a search process in a framework
11
The model presented here analyzes the behavior of a monopolistically compet-
itive economy in which firms face different market demands and maximize profits
by setting a regular price and a promotional strategy composed of a discount price
and a promotion frequency. Following Banks and Moorthy (1999), the model al-
lows for consumer heterogeneity by having agents with different price elasticities of
demand, and introduces a time cost of looking for price promotions. In this con-
text, it is possible to make an explicit distinction between regular and promotional
prices: regular prices are always available to anyone, while promotional prices are
only available when offered and only to those who look for them. The approach here
thus differs from previous work in the area in at least two important aspects. First,
the definition of regular and promotional prices differs from previous work. Second,
consumers choose optimally the time spent looking for price promotions.
In this setting, heterogeneity in price sensitivity and the assumption that
households must pay a time cost in order to take advantage of price promotions
are enough to (i) ensure that household time choices interact with firm promotional
strategies, creating an environment in which regular and promotional prices coexist
and (ii) generate a new source of price flexibility through movements in promotional
prices.
similar to that used in the job search literature. The authors show that, in a model with a semi-
durable good and consumer heterogeneity, there is an equilibrium pattern in which firms choose
to post a high price for a number of periods followed by a single period sale. The sale rationales
developed in these papers have not been introduced in a more general monetary DSGE framework
yet, so their macroeconomic implications remain to be explored.
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Given this framework, the model generates a large degree of micro-level price
movement even in the absence of macroeconomic shocks, with firm-level realized
prices fluctuating between the regular and promotional values in response to the
firm’s optimal choice of the fraction of time at which its product will be offered
on promotion and to consumers’ optimal choices of the time invested looking for
those promotions. However, even though not every price movement is the result of
a macroeconomic shock, the model’s rationale for promotions has effects on how the
economy reacts to monetary shocks. When extended in order to allow for Calvo-
stickiness in regular prices, the model generates individual price series that behave in
a way consistent with recent empirical studies: (i) regular (non-promotional prices)
are sticky; (ii) prices including promotions change very frequently; (iii) realized
prices show rigidity in the form of inertia in reference prices around which weekly
prices fluctuate.
When studying the effects of monetary shocks, the model displays output
responses well below the ones obtained with a standard Calvo model calibrated to
match the frequency of regular price changes. In this case, sales are important
for macroeconomics since their existence creates a dynamic pricing arrangement in
which the market can outsmart the Calvo fairy. More generally, this result points to
the importance of further exploration on how consumer behavior and firm-customer
interactions are designed in macroeconomic models.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The model is developed
in the second section. The solution method, parameters and steady state values are
discussed in the third section. The fourth section presents results on the model’s
13
micro price behavior and the macroeconomic implications of price promotions, par-
ticularly on the responses to monetary shocks. The fifth section concludes.
2.1 The Model
The model consists of households, firms and a government. Money is introduced
as an argument of the utility function; households purchase goods for consump-
tion, supply labor, spend time looking for price promotions and hold money and
bonds, while firms hire labor and produce and sell a continuum of differentiated
consumption goods produced in a monopolistically competitive market.
Households differ in the price elasticity parameter of the Dixit-Stiglitz con-
sumption aggregator. Given this heterogeneity in consumption, each firm’s price
setting decision includes a choice of a regular price, and a promotional strategy
consisting of a promotional price and a promotion probability (the fraction of time
that the good is offered at promotion prices).
2.1.1 Households
There is a measure one of infinitely lived households divided in two possible types:
measure h of high price elasticity consumers (HECs), and measure 1−h of low price
elasticity consumers (LECs).
High Elasticity Consumers


















1− nht − sht
)]
(2.1)
where u(.), φ(.), and v(.) are strictly increasing and strictly concave, mh are
nominal balances, nh is the fraction of time spent working and sh is the fraction of




















where the parameter ε > 1 governs the price elasticity of demand for individ-
ual goods, θh(ft, s
h
t ) is the fraction of goods purchased at promotion prices (with
demanded quantities {chpjt }), and 1 − θh(ft, sht ) is the fraction of goods acquired at
regular prices (with demanded quantities {chrjt }). I do not consider any additional
frictions between consumers and firms such as matching frictions, so θh(f, sht ) is
given by ft · sht where ft is the fraction of time that a firm offers its product at
promotional prices.4
Notice that even though a firm can sell a good at promotional and regular
prices simultaneously (this will become clear when presenting the problem of the
firm), in each period of time a consumer can acquire a specific good at either the
regular or promotional price, but not both. Therefore, ε in (2.2) has the same
interpretation as it would in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz consumption aggregator
4For simplicity, and anticipating a symmetric equilibrium, in the consumer’s problem I assume
fj,t = ft for every firm j.
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and captures the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods.
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where P ht is the price of the consumption composite, w
h
t is the real wage
received for labor services, Bht is the amount of nominal bonds, Tt is a nominal
transfer from the government, and Πt are nominal profits from the differentiated
firms that are assumed to be owned by the households.















Then, the relationship between quantities of a good bought at regular and




























Notice that using the demand equations (2.4) and (2.5) and the price aggre-



















t yield the standard intratemporal
and intertemporal optimality conditions:



















The introduction of a time cost in order to take advantage of price promotions,
on the other hand, creates a new intratemporal optimal margin. The first order
condition for sht is


































Equation (2.12) implies that the high elasticity consumer will choose opti-
mal sht by equating the utility cost incurred when looking for promotions and the
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marginal utility gain derived from spending an extra unit of time looking for pro-
motions. The right hand side of (12) has two components. The first one comes from







than zero, implying an increase in overall consumption coming from higher quanti-
ties of additional goods (a fraction θhs (f, s
h
t ) of them) now available at promotional
prices. The second component is negative and corresponds to the utility loss because
of higher spending after increasing the consumer’s time searching for promotions.
When a good previously consumed at regular prices is found at a lower price as a
result of additional time looking for price promotions, the consumer increases her
consumption in a quantity such that her new expenditure on that good is greater
than previously. This is a direct result of the elastic demand assumption typical in












































The left hand side of (2.13) is the relative price of leisure in terms of forgone
labor income, while the right hand side is the relative price of leisure in terms of
forgone gains from additional time spent looking for price promotions. Then, in
equilibrium, consumers optimally choose their labor and shopping time allocations
by equating the two alternative opportunity costs of an additional unit of leisure.
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High Elasticity Consumers
Low elasticity consumers differ from high elasticity ones only in the price elasticity




















with ε > η > 1.
The LEC set of optimality conditions is analogous to the HEC one but chang-




















There is a measure one continuum of firms indexed by j. Firm j minimizes costs
wtNjt, where wt is the real wage and Njt is total labor hired by the firm, subject to
a production restriction summarizing the available technology where output, cjt, is
a function of labor and a productivity shock: cjt = e
ztNjt, with E(zt) = 0.
From the firm’s cost minimization problem, real marginal cost is given by




Flexible Regular Prices. The firm’s price setting problem consists of choosing
prjt, p
p













1− θh(fjt, sht )
]
chrjt













1− θh(fjt, sht )
]
chrjt
+ (1− h)θl(fjt, slt)c
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subject to the demand equations (2.4), (2.5), and their LEC counterparts.
The first order conditions for prj , p
p
j and fjt are
h
[
1− θh(fjt, sht )
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5A real world justification for having firms choosing fjt may come from the existence of market-
ing agreements in which a producer specifies the number of times in which a retailer can put the
good on sale in a given period (i.e. 20 days in the next three months). Then, the exact moment of
promotion is chosen by the retailer and the producer’s decision ends up being about the fraction
of time that the good is on sale. Alternatively, the firm may have multiple retail outlets and may





















jt + (1− h)θlf (fjt, slt)clrjt
]
(2.19)
Equations (2.17) and (2.18) equate the marginal revenue obtained from a vari-
ation in demand because of a change in a specific price (regular or promotional),
with the marginal production cost of satisfying that marginal demand.
Equation (2.19), on the other hand, comes from the fact that firms choose the
fraction of time that they put their good on promotion. The left hand side is the
marginal profit obtained from demand at promotional prices when increasing fjt,
while the right hand side is the marginal profit obtained from demand at regular
prices when increasing fjt.




























The two terms in the left hand side of (2.20) corresponds to the marginal
revenue coming from increasing the probability with which the firm offers its good
on promotion. θhf (fjt, s
h








t are the additional fractions
of consumers that find the good at promotional prices after the firm increases ft,
and ppjtc
hp




jt − prjtclrjt correspond to the additional revenue coming
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from these new purchases.6 On the other hand, the two terms in the right hand
side of the equation correspond to the marginal cost associated with increasing ft,
with chpjt − chrjt and c
lp
jt − clrjt representing the change in production needed to satisfy
the higher demand coming from additional consumers able to acquire the good at
promotional prices.
Notice that the standard monopolistic competition model is nested in the










With no consumer heterogeneity (h = 1), f = 0 and therefore θh = 0. Regular













With h = 1, Pt = P
h
t , and (2.21) corresponds to the pricing optimality condi-
tion of a model with monopolistic competition and flexible prices.
Sticky Regular Prices. For the exercises performed in the following sections,
it will prove useful to amend the model by including a nominal rigidity in the
regular price. For this purpose, it is assumed that regular prices are subject to
Calvo staggering. There may be reasons to consider ridigity in promotional prices
6Since ε > 1, revenue from sales of good j at promotional prices is greater than revenue from
sales at regular prices, so the terms ppjtc
hp




jt − prjtclrjt, are positive.
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as well.7 However, there is evidence that sale prices are less sticky than regular ones
(Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008)) and allowing for rigidities only on regular prices is
a simple way of capturing this fact. Also, stickiness in regular prices suffices to
generate the type of reference price rigidity found in recent studies on micro price
data like Eichenbaum et al. (2011) and Klenow and Malin (2010), and facilitates
comparison with Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011) who also impose a Calvo rigidity
only in regular prices and who argue that their exercise will provide an upper bound
for price flexibility in the aggregate if there is rigidity in promotional prices in reality.




























































Where ρ is the probability of not being able to change the regular price in the
period, and Ξt+1/t is the firm’s stochastic discount factor for nominal payoffs.
7For example, firms could be constrained in their ability to change their promotional strategy
because of contractual pricing arrangements between producers and retailers.
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The first order conditions for ppjt and fjt are the same as in the flexible price








































Notice that when h = 1 (and therefore ft = 0) there is only one type of
consumer in the economy and Pt = P
h















Which is the standard optimal pricing equation in a model with Calvo rigidities
and no capital.
Further details on the solution of the sticky regular price case are provided in
Appendix 1.
2.1.3 The Government
The Government Budget Constraint
Each period, the government satisfies the following budget constraint:
(Bt −Bt−1) + (Mt −Mt−1) = Tt + it−1Bt−1 (2.26)
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where Tt are lump sum transfers.
Monetary Policy
It is assumed that the Central Bank reacts to inflation and output growth according





















where πt is the inflation rate, yt is total output, π and i are the steady state
inflation and interest rates, and ξR,t is a monetary policy shock. This specification
corresponds to the one used by Aruoba and Schorfheide (2011) with the exception
that these authors also introduce a time varying inflation target as part of the
interest rate feedback rule.
2.1.4 The Economy’s Resource Constraint
The economy’s resource constraint can be recovered combining the consumers’ bud-
get constraints, the government balanced budget equation and the expression for
firms’ profits. Pre-multiplying the HEC’s budget constraint (2.3) by h and the
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] (2.28)
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t + (1− h)nlt.
Finally, plugging equations (2.26), (2.30) and the expressions for firms’ profits
and marginal costs into (2.29), we have:
ezt
[








1− θh(ft, sht )
]
chrt








where (2.31) is the economy’s resource constraint.
2.1.5 Characterizing the Economy-wide Price Level
The final equilibrium condition is the relationship between the economy wide price




t . In order to find
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with the weights of each price given by the ratio of goods purchased at that price
with respect to the total quantity of goods consumed in the economy. From (2.35)














where, from the firm’s first order conditions for ppt and p
r
t , the optimal real
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Then, equation (2.36) defines the economy-wide markup as a time-varying
weighted average of the real markups associated with the two prices available in the
economy.
2.1.6 Stochastic Processes
The stochastic process for productivity zt is given by
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t ∼ i.i.d.(0, σz) (2.37)
Finally, it is assumed that the monetary policy shock ξR,t is serially uncor-
related with mean zero and variance one. Then, the autoregresive component in
monetary shocks is given by the interest rate smoothing parameter ρR in (2.27).
2.1.7 Equilibrium















t, ft}, portfolio choices {mht ,mlt, Bht , Blt,Mt, Bt}, prices {Pt, P ht , P lt ,
prt , p
p




t, it}, and transfers {Tt,Πt} such that:










t } solve the HEC utility maximization problem.










t} solve the LEC utility maximization problem.
iii) {prt , p
p
t , ft} are such that firms maximize profits.
iv) Aggregation satisfies equations (2.2), (2.7), (2.14) , (2.15), (2.30) and
(2.35).
v) The government runs a balanced budget.
vi) Markets clear: Nt = hn
h
t + (1 − h)nlt, Bt = hBht + (1 − h)Blt, Mt =
hmht + (1− h)mlt.
2.1.8 Price Discrimination in General Equilibrium
As observed in the model’s equilibrium conditions, this economy has the feature that
both regular and promotional prices coexist at the same time for each firm. The
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key modeling element behind this result is the fact that consumers must spend time
looking for price promotions. This is formally stated in the following propositions:
Proposition 1: Given strictly increasing utility in consumption and leisure,
in a general equilibrium with monopolistic competition (ε > 1, η > 1) and with
consumers looking for price promotions (sht ∈ (0, 1), slt ∈ (0, 1)), firms always price
discriminate by setting a regular price greater than the promotional one (prjt > p
p
jt).
Proof: Suppose not. That is, let prjt ≤ p
p
jt. Consider the HEC case; using the
demand equations (2.4) and (2.5), equation (2.12) can be re-expressed as:














Given ε > 1 and the assumption that u(·) is strictly increasing, prjt ≤ p
p
jt
implies that the right hand side of equation (2.38) is lower or equal to zero, so
(2.38) is satisfied only when v′(·) ≤ 0, a contradiction that violates the assumption
that v(.) is strictly increasing.
Proposition 2: Given strictly increasing utility in consumption and leisure,
in a general equilibrium with monopolistic competition (ε > 1, η > 1) and with
consumers looking for price promotions (sht ∈ (0, 1), slt ∈ (0, 1)), firms follow an
active promotional policy by making the promotional price available with a positive
probability ft > 0.
Proof: analogous to the one for Proposition 1.
In this model, then, firms will always price discriminate; that is, they will set
two different prices for the same good (prjt > p
p
jt), and they will always follow an
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active promotional strategy (fjt > 0), making their promotional price available for
consumers willing to spend the time needed to find a promotion and take advantage
of the lower price.
The intuition behind this result is that there is a cost associated with finding
a price promotion, and that cost is paid only by consumers and not by firms. If, in
a given period, a firm decides not to offer promotions (fjt = 0), it will charge only
its regular price at every moment of time within that period without distinguishing
between consumption demands. However, recognizing that looking for discounts is
costly for consumers and that only a fraction of them will access price promotions,
the firm can increase profits by making the promotional price available with a given
probability (fjt > 0) and therefore costlessly distinguishing between two different
types of demand: demand from consumers that find the price promotion and demand
from consumers that don’t.8 This follows the basic principle of using promotions for
price discrimination purposes studied in the Industrial Organization and Marketing
literature: when a firm wants to use a price promotion as a price discrimination
tool, it should try to make it easy for some consumers to access the promotion, but
harder for others; that is, the promotion must impose some cost on which consumers
differ, rewarding the people willing to bear that cost (see Banks and Moorthy (1999)
and Lu and Moorthy (2007)).
8The firm can price discriminate even if it puts its good on promotion all the time (ft = 1).
The reason for this is that since consumers do not spend all of their time looking for promotions
(sht < 1, s
l
t < 1), only fractions θ
h(ft, s
h
t ) and θ
l(ft, s
l
t) of the firm’s good are sold at promotional
prices, with the complement transacted at the regular price.
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The most salient real-world example of price promotions associated with con-
sumer time costs is the use of coupons.9 Coupons are certainly an important promo-
tional vehicle in the United States, but there are several other promotional arrange-
ments that are associated with different types of consumer costs; examples of these
are mail-in rebates, cash-back offers, loyalty cards, reward programs and discount
clubs.10 11 The mechanism developed here can be thought of as a reduced form
9There are several types of time costs associated with the usage of coupons beyond the standard
“cut and clip” costs: (i) in order to take advantage of the promotion, the consumer may need to
spend time looking for the coupon (i.e. going over mailed fliers and newspapers, or browsing the
internet); (ii) it may be necessary to prepare shopping lists so the coupon may be used in a future
shopping trip before its expiration date; (iii) coupon redemption may be conditioned on some
information exchange with the consumer (i.e. logging into a retailer’s web page and providing
contact information, or participating in an on-line consumer survey).
10According to NCH Marketing Services Inc., in 2009, 311 billion coupons were distributed by
consumer packaged-goods companies in the United States, 3.2 billion of these were redeemed, and
the redemption value reached 3.5 billion dollars. Also, a recent consumer study by Inmar Inc.
reports that 75% of the participants in a shopping habits survey conducted by the Food Marketing
Institute stated that coupons had at least some influence on their decision to buy a product. Inmar
also reports that in the first half of 2009, 68% of US households participating in Nielsen’s Homescan
Consumer Panel used at least one coupon.
11An interesting fact about some of these promotional vehicles is that they are not used only by
grocery stores and supermarkets, which have received most of the attention in recent studies on
the implications of micro price data for macroeconomic modeling. Mail-in rebates, for example,
are widely used by home appliance providers and electronics retail stores, with offers ranging from
small-ticket items like computer accessories to big-ticket ones like home entertainment systems.
Different types of cash-back options are also very common among automobile dealers. On the
other hand, loyalty cards, typical in supermarkets and grocery stores, are also common among
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capturing a broader fact with interesting implications when modeling price discrim-
ination in monetary models: not every price promotion is realized, and whether a
consumer ends up receiving a discount or not often depends endogenously on how
much time, effort and money she is willing to invest in taking advantage of the
offered promotion. This could be the case even for on-shelf promotions in the sense
that even though there is no explicit consumer cost associated with them, a shopper
may need to spend some time and attention comparing prices and brands before
finally picking the products offered on discount.12
Thus, it is the fact that price promotions are costly for the consumer that
ensures the coexistence of the two prices in the model economy. This will allow for
a large amount of firm level transaction price variation over time even in the absence
of shocks, a result consistent with Nakamura’s (2008) finding of a high amount of
idiosyncratic price variation in product categories with temporary sales, suggesting
that retail prices may vary largely as a consequence of dynamic pricing strategies on
book, music and electronics retailers, while service providers like banks and airlines often offer
loyalty programs associated with their products. Finally, discount clubs include warehouse clubs
that sell grocery store and supermarket products, but also providers of big-ticket items like home
furnishings. Also, wholesale clubs like Costco and BJ’s sell a variety of non-supermarket household
goods, including TVs, books, clothes, etc.
12Sometimes this may require shopping trips to different locations in order to compare on-shelf
promotions between retailers. When the product is not offered at a physical location, taking
advantage of price promotions may require spending time browsing the internet looking for the
best available deals. Think, for example, about buying a plane ticket using kayak.com instead
of visiting a specific airline, or finding discount lodging at hotwire.com instead of contacting a
particular hotel.
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the part of retailers or manufacturers. In the model, this dynamic pricing strategy
consists of firms offering costly promotions and choosing the fraction of time at
which they are available, but being indifferent about the exact moment of time at
which a promotion is realized. Consider for example a case with no shocks and
zero inflation in which firms choose to offer their goods on promotion 50% of the
time. Panel a) in Figure 2.1 shows a sample time path for the price strategy of
an individual firm that randomly chooses when to offer a price promotion, subject
to ensuring that the the promotion is available half of the time. The regular price
will be offered all the time, while the promotional price is offered only at intervals.
Panel b) depicts the time series of the minimum price available, which is equal to
prt when no promotion is offered and p
p
t when a promotion is in place.
The following sections show how this type of strategic combined pricing, with
nominal rigidity in regular prices, helps in generating price behavior similar to that
documented in the recent microeconomic evidence on price-setting, and how this
pricing has important implications on the way real variables respond to monetary
shocks.
Among recent research on sale prices in monetary models, the Kehoe and
Midrigan (2007, 2008, 2010) framework is an example of a model in which prices
fluctuate only in response to stochastic shocks and not to randomization decisions
made for price discrimination purposes. In their setup, every period a firm can ei-
ther pay a large fixed cost and change their price permanently or pay a smaller cost
and change their price only for one period. Kehoe and Midrigan’s models, there-
fore, require time varying shocks and price rigidities in order to generate temporary
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Figure 2.1: FIRMS PRICES IN THE ABSENCE OF MACRO SHOCKS
movements away from the regular price.
Closer in spirit to the model presented here is the work of Guimaraes and
Sheedy (2011). They develop a model in which households consume a continuum
of heterogeneous goods and a continuum of heterogeneous brands for each good.
Consumers have different price sensitivities with respect to different sets of goods,
being loyal to specific brands for a given measure of products (that is, they do not
receive utility from consuming any alternative brand) but being bargain hunters
willing to substitute between different brands for the rest of the goods. Each firm
35
produces a brand specific product and faces a measure of loyal consumers and a
measure of bargain hunters. Firms do not know the type of any individual consumer,
and cannot practice price discrimination directly. Instead they follow the strategy
of holding periodic sales in order to target the two types of consumers at different
moments of time. This is done by randomizing the timing of sales after choosing a
fraction of time (i.e. a number of moments within a given period) at which the firm
charges a lower price. At any one point in time, all consumers recive the same price.
As in the framework presented in this document, Guimaraes and Sheedy’s
(2011) setup is able to generate price fluctuations even in the absence of the stan-
dard aggregate or idiosyncratic shocks included in DSGE models, as a result of the
dynamic pricing strategy followed by firms that target different types of customers.
In contrast to Guimaraes and Sheedy, however, the model developed in this paper
does feature price discrimination at many points in time as part of the firm’s optimal





transactions are made using both prices. This paper’s framework thus allows for
a distinction between price-quote and realized-price series. As I will show below,
when combined with a nominal rigidity in the definition of regular prices, the model
delivers individual price series with the type of rigidity recently found in studies on
reference prices in micro price data, but with different macroeconomic implications
from those found by Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011).
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2.2 Solution Method and Parameter Values
The model is solved around a zero-inflation steady state applying Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe’s (2004a) local approximation algorithm. I assume the following functional
forms:






















v(1− nht − sht ) = Ψlog
(
1− nht − sht
)
v(1− nlt − slt) = Ψlog
(
1− nlt − slt
)
There are fourteen parameters in the model: the intertemporal discount factor,
β; the constants pre-multiplying the money and leisure utility terms, Ψ and α; the
measure of high elasticity consumers, h; the elasticities of substitution for HECs and
LECs, ε and η; the probability of a firm not being able to change its regular price, ρ;
the interest rate smoothing parameter, ρR; the inflation and output growth weights
in the Central Bank’s interest rate rule, ψ1 and ψ2; and the parameters governing
the stochastic processes for productivity and monetary policy, σz, ρz and σR.
The length of each period is one week, so the discount factor β is set at 0.961/52.
The Calvo parameter, ρ, is set at 0.974, implying that, on average, firms change their
regular prices every 9 months (39 weeks); this time between changes is in the middle
range of the estimates reported by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). The values for
the productivity stochastic process, ρz and σz, correspond to the weekly counterparts
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of the quarterly values used in Hansen (1985), while the parameters for the interest
rate rule and the monetary policy stochastic process are taken from Aruoba and
Schorfheide (2009): ψ1 = 1.7, ψ2 = 0.86, ρR = 0.61
1/13, σR = 0.0036/13.
The values of Ψ, α, ε, η and h are chosen to match five steady state calibration
targets: average hours worked of 1/3, a weekly velocity of money of 0.15, a ratio of
time spent looking for promotions with respect to hours worked of 1/4, a probability
with which goods are offered on promotion of 0.7, and an average gross markup of
1.4.
The target value for total hours worked, hnh + (1 − h)nl, is standard in the
literature. The value for money velocity was computed using the formula V =
GDP/(52 ·M1), where M1 is the weekly seasonally adjusted series for M1 of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and GDP is annual nominal
Gross Domestic Product. The 1975:1-2009:9 average is 0.15, close to the weekly
analogue of the quarterly value calculated by Aruoba and Schorfheide (2009) using
sweep-adjusted M1 data.
Time spent looking for price promotions is the only type of shopping time
in the model. Therefore the target for the shopping/working time ratio is taken
from US time surveys with information on daily time spent purchasing goods and
services, and is close to the value used in Arseneau and Chugh (2007).13
The targeted markup is within the range of estimated values for the US and
13The American Time Use Survey (ATUS) provides nationally representative estimates of how
and where Americans spend their time. Data files are available from 2003 to 2009 and can be
accessed at http://www.bls.gov/tus/.
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close to values used in trade and macroeconomic studies such as Bernard et al.
(2003) and Biblie et al (2007).
The choice of the target value for f requires more elaboration. In the model,
f is the fraction of time firms offer their goods at promotional prices. Moreover,
this is the only type of price promotion considered in the framework developed in
Section 2. Given the model’s definition of promotional prices as only available when
offered and only to those who look for them, the empirical counterpart of f should
correspond to a type of promotion that is not always offered and that requires some
search effort from the consumer in order to be realized.
The James M. Kilts Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Busi-
ness provides data useful for constructing this target. The Booth School provides
several publicly available datasets on weekly store-level transaction prices for over
100 stores operated by Dominick’s Finer Foods (DFF), which have been used in
various macroeconomic studies such as Golosov and Lucas (2007), Midrigan (2008)
and Kehoe and Midrigan (2007,2008). One of these datasets, the Customer Count
Files, has information on total coupon redemption figures by DFF defined product-
category. Since sale coupons are a natural example of the type of promotion dis-
cussed in Section 2, I use this database to construct a proxy for the probability that
firms offer their goods at promotional prices in a given period.
I proceed as follows: first, for each product category I construct a dummy
variable, dt, equal to 1 if at least one coupon was redeemed in a given week (that is,
if the coupon redemption figure is different from zero). Next, I compute the fraction










f̂k/(number of good categories).
The underlying assumption is that if a promotional price is available in a given
week, then there is at least one person that takes advantage of it (alternatively, at
least one coupon is redeemed). Therefore, I assume that if the coupon redemption
figure in a given week is zero (dt = 0), then no coupons were offered that week.
When considering a sample of all categories for which coupons were redeemed
at least once in the sample period, the sales-weighted value for f is 0.87. When
considering all product categories, the value is 0.7. Appendix 2 provides more
details on these calculations.
Of course, it would be ideal to perform a similar calculation for a broader
range of goods and sectors. However, in spite of this limitation, and given the
lack of richer data on non-shelf price promotions for other sectors and goods, the
above described calculation provides an empirical benchmark consistent with the
theoretical definition of f and with the model’s definition of promotional prices.
Table 2.2 presents the model’s steady state under this parameterization, where
p̂p and p̂r are relative prices with respect to the economy-wide price and ah and al are
HEC and LEC real balances with respect to each consumer’s effective price index.
HECs represent 9% of the economy’s population and spend a large fraction of












As expected, HECs spend a lower fraction of their time looking for price pro-
motions. HECs are very price sensitive, and whey they find a promotion they
substitute a lot, buying very large quantities of a good when it is found on sale,
so they are able to take advantage of price discounts even when spending only a
very small fraction of time looking for them. LECs, on the other hand, substitute
less when a good is on sale, and need to spend a higher fraction of time looking for
promotions in order to take advantage of price discounts.
Under the current parameterization, the firm sets an optimal discount of 31%,
very close to the values reported by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), 30%, and
Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), 25%. The discount price is available 70% of the time,
but only 6% of total transactions are realized at promotional prices. This value is
close to the expenditure-weighted fraction of price quotes that are sales reported by
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), 7.4%.
2.3 The Workings of the Model
2.3.1 Individual Price Setting Behavior
A first step in evaluating the performance of the model is to assess its ability to
generate individual price series similar to those reported in recent microeconomic
studies of price setting. As mentioned in Section 1, a recently documented feature
of the CPI data is that prices including sales tend to change roughly every quarter,
while prices excluding sales tend to remain unchanged for two to three quarters
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Table 2.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Comment
Intertemporal discount factor β 0.961/52 Length of a period = 1 week
Fraction of HECs h 0.09 To match f = 0.7
Scale parameter leisure utility Ψ 0.21 To match n = 1/3
Scale parameter money utility α 0.005 To match V elocity = 0.15
HEC elasticity of substitution ε 20.26 To match s/n = 1/4
LEC elasticity of substitution η 2.44 To match Markup = 1.4
Calvo parameter for regular
prices





1/13 Weekly analogue ofAruoba and
Schorfheide's (2009) quarterly value
Ination weight interest rate
rule
ψ1 1.7 From Aruoba and Schorfheide (2009)
Output growth weight interest
rate rule
ψ2 0.86 From Aruoba and Schorfheide (2009)
Standard deviation for
monetary policy shocks
σR 0.0036/13 Weekly analogue ofAruoba and








σz 0.007/13 Weekly analogue of Hansen's (1985)
quarterly value
1
(Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008; Klenow and Krystov, 2008; Klenow and Malin,
2010). Also, new evidence from high frequency scanner data has found that nominal
rigidities take the form of inertia in reference (modal) prices, with weekly prices
fluctuating around a reference value that tends to remain constant over extended
periods of time (see Kehoe and Midrigan (2007, 2008), and especially Eichenbaum
et al., (2011)). This point is illustrated in Figure 2.2, which displays the time series
42
Table 2.2: Steady State Values
  
π = πh = πl = 0
"# $# %
chr = 0.05 clr = 0.25 p̂r = 1.11
chp = 88.9 clp = 0.63 p̂p = 0.77
nh = 0.93 nl = 0.27 discount = 0.31
sh = 0.01 sl = 0.09 f = 0.70
θh(f, sh) = 0.009 θl(f, sl) = 0.06 θ(f, s) = 0.06

behavior of four selected DFF items. From the figure one can see that there seems to
be an inertial reference price (i.e. the most observed price in a given time window)
and prices tend to return to this reference value after having deviated from it.
The model is able to replicate this type of behavior in prices, because it differ-
entiates not only between regular and promotional prices, but also between price-
quotes (like the ones recorded in CPI data) and realized transactions prices (like
the ones recorded in scanner data). To see this, Figure 2.3 presents individual price
simulations of the sticky regular price version of the model.
Panel a) presents the regular and promotional price series of an individual firm
for a simulation of 250 weeks.14. The graph depicts the optimal regular price that
the firm would set each period were it able to do so. However, the firm is subject
to a Calvo friction and it is not able to adjust its regular price every period, so
14The series is constructed by iterating forward the relative price optimal decision rules of the
linearized model for 250 periods, and then by simulating the behavior of an individual firm. Each
period, there is a probability 1 − ρ that the firm will be able to set its price at the optimal price
level prjt = p
r∗






Figure 2.2: PRICE EVOLUTION IN FOUR SELECTED PRODUCTS
its actual regular price, depicted by the dotted line, tends to remain unchanged for
several periods, adjusting to the optimal value every time that the firm is allowed
to change its price.
Panel b) presents the evolution of the two prices available to consumers. The
regular price is available in any period. The promotional price, however, is not
always available, since the firm optimally chooses the fraction of time at which the
price is offered. That is, in each period there is a probability ft that the lowest
available price will correspond to ppjt and a probability 1− ft that the only available
price will be prjt.
Consider the exercise of constructing a price quote series reporting the lowest
available price in each period. In this case, the series will change almost every
period, with frequent fluctuations between the regular and promotional price and
with occasional shifts to the regular one. The series of price quotes is presented in
44
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a) Regular Prices (optimal: solid line, realized: 
dashed line)  and Optimal Promotional Prices 
(circle markers) 
b) Available Prices                                                                        
(Regular: dashed line, Promotional: solid line)
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panel (c).
The price series described in panel (c), however, corresponds to quoted prices
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Figure 2.4: SIMULATED PRICE FOR AN INDIVIDUAL FIRM: THE CASE OF
POSITIVE STEADY STATE INFLATION
a) Regular Prices (optimal: solid line, realized: 
dashed line)  and Optimal Promotional Prices 
(circle markers) 
b) Available Prices                                                                        
(Regular: dashed line, Promotional: solid line)
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and not to the ones resulting from actual transactions. Each period, there is a
probability θt that the good will be purchased at the promotional price p
p
j , and a
probability 1− θt that it will be purchased at the firm’s regular price.15 The series
of realized prices is presented in panel (d), showing the type of rigidity reported
by Eichenbaum et. al. (2011). Realized prices show rigidity in the form of inertial





t ) + (1− h)θlt(fjt, slt)
16In terms of constructing the underlying price series from observed data, this exercise is more
consistent with the use of transaction-based datasets like supermarket scanner data than with price
quotes like those recorded by BLS visitors. For example, think about a grocery store that uses
loyalty cards in a way such that every week some of its products are offered on promotion and
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The model with zero steady state inflation is able to replicate the behavior of
observed individual time series as long as these do not trend because of inflation
pressures. Since some individual price series seem to show an upward trend (see for
example the Kellogg’s Corn Flakes example in Figure 2.2), the model was also solved
around a 0.05 percent weekly steady state inflation rate; this value corresponds to an
annual cumulative inflation rate of 3 percent (the post-Volker average in the US).17
The simulated price series are presented in panels (a) to (d) of Figure 2.4.
The model, then, is able to deliver price-quote and realized-price series consis-
tent with the microeconomic evidence. Because of the Calvo-type rigidity, the time
series behavior of an individual firm’s regular price will be highly inertial. When
including price promotions, on the other hand, prices will change very frequently.
This behavior is consistent with the recent evidence on CPI price quotes that finds
their price tags display both the regular and promotional price. According to the BLS, a sale price
must be temporarily lower than the regular price, be available to all consumers, and be usually
identified by a sign or statement on the price tag (Klenow and Krystov, 2008). In the specific case
of loyalty cards, discounts are reported as only if the outlet confirms that more than 50% of its
customers use these cards (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008). So, in this example, if the percent
of customers using loyalty cards is lower to 50%, a price-quoting visitor will not even record the
sales. But even if the sales were recorded, the visitor could gather data on both the regular and
promotional price but she would have no information on the number of transactions closed at each
price. A rich enough scanner dataset, on the other hand, would record both the regular and the
promotional price as well as whether the loyalty card was used at the time of each transaction.
17The pattern of steady state allocations when the model is solved around a positive inflation
rate is similar to the one observed in the zero inflation case but with a higher equilibrium discount,
0.45.
47
that the median frequency of price changes is sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion
of sales (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008; Klenow and Krystov, 2008; Klenow and
Malin, 2010).
2.3.2 Does Micro Flexibility Translates Into Higher Neu-
trality at the Macro Level?
Figure 2.5 presents the responses of output to a monetary shock in the model with
price promotions and sticky regular prices and in a standard model with no consumer
heterogeneity and sticky prices. The latter model with no price promotions was
calibrated to replicate the steady state hours, velocity and markup targets presented
in Table 2.1 and with the same Calvo parameter used in the price promotions model.
The model with price promotions presents a smaller and less persistent output
response, with an impact deviation equal to one third of the one obtained with the
standard Calvo model.
Figure 2.6 helps in further understanding the intuition behind this result.
Given the introduction of a New Keynesian interest rate rule, the model assumes
that the impact of monetary policy on output operates through the real interest rate.
There is thus a mapping between the time paths of output and the real interest rate.
Panel (a) depicts the responses of these variables for both models. Real variables
in the promotions model follow the same pattern as those of the Calvo model, but
with smaller and less persistent responses.










t ).The graph also
shows the average price response constructed using ϕt and 1 − ϕt as weights for
the promotional regular price components respectively. After a shock to the interest
rate, firms react mainly by reducing their promotional price and therefore increasing
their optimal discount. Thus it is the possibility of adjusting their promotional price
that provides firms with an alternative channel of adjustment when facing monetary
shocks.
Finally, panel (c) presents the responses of the probability of price promotions
and the size of the promotion-economy (the share of real activity sold at promotional
prices, ϕt in equation 2.35) in response to a monetary policy shock. The graph
shows that firms use the size of the promotional discount and not the frequency
of promotions as a shock absorbing mechanism. Given the contraction in demand
after the increase in the real interest rate, the share of the promotion economy also
decreases and firms react by reducing the fraction of time at which they offer price
promotions.18
Why is it that ft decreases after a shock to the interest rate? To understand
this, look at the two panels of Figure 2.7 which depict the time allocations of the
two types of consumers. The shock affects consumers’ time-allocation decisions
asymmetrically.
HECs consumers take much more advantage from price promotions that LECs,
and when they find a promotion they substitute large quantities of goods at regular
prices for good at promotional prices. Now that the size of the price discount has
18The complete set of the models impulse response functions is presented in Appendix A.4.
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increased, they do not need to spend as much time as they used to looking for price
promotions (they find less promotions but at larger discounts and they take full ad-
vantage of them) and they increase they labor time so they can have more resources
dedicated to larger substitution of regular-price consumption for promotional-price
consumption. Since LECs show a much lower degree of substitution when they
find a good on promotion, they have an incentive to increase the time they spent
looking for price promotions (they do not substitute as much as HECs do, so they
need to find more promotions in order to take advantage of the increase in the price
discount) and decrease their labor time.
How does this affect the firms’ decisions about ft? Since firms cannot dis-
tinguish between the two types of consumers, they price-discriminate by choosing
a fraction of time at which they offer their goods at promotional prices. As men-
tioned in previous sections, in doing so, the firms take advantage of that fact that
promotions are costly in the sense that consumers have to spent time looking for
promotions in other to take advantage of them. In a perfect price discrimination
environment, the firms would be able to distinguish between types of consumers and
charge a high price to LECs and a low price to HECs. In the model presented here,
the firm could achieve perfect price discrimination if HECs looked for promotions
all of their time (sh = 1) and HECs never looked for promotions (sl = 0). In that
case, by setting ft = 1 the firm could completely distinguish between HECs and
LECs and charge optimal perfect price discrimination prices (see Appendix A.3 for
a formal treatment of this issue).




t increases. But, as explained in previous paragraphs, this is exactly the opposite
of what happens after a nominal shock when, given the asymmetric response of prices
(the increase of the price discount) HECs decrease sht and LECs increase s
l
t. Firms,
therefore have less incentive to price-discriminate and reduce ft.
The first panel in Figure 2.8 compares the output response of the model with
price promotions presented in Figure 2.5 with several responses of the Calvo model
calibrated to different times between price changes. No Calvo response overlaps
exactly with the one of the model with price promotions. The reason for this is that
the model with price promotions combines features of both flexible and sticky price
models; the output response is small on impact but it dies out at a lower rate than
those of the Calvo model.
What is, then, the equivalent response in a Calvo model? The second panel of
the figure presents two responses with the same cumulative impact on output. From
the point of view of the overall effect of an interest rate shock on output, the model
with price promotions calibrated to a time between regular price changes of nine
months is equivalent to a Calvo model calibrated to a time between price changes
of one month. The dynamics, however, are very different; the response of the Calvo
model shows a much higher initial impact but dies out almost twice as fast as the
response of the model with price promotions.
The near neutrality result contrasts with that obtained by Guimaraes and
Sheedy (2011), who find that even though their model delivers individual price paths
similar to ones observed in the data, aggregate prices adjust by little in response
to monetary shocks, which therefore have large effects on real variables. Since the
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flexibility of prices at the micro level due to sales does not translate into flexibility
at the macro level, the authors conclude that sales are essentially irrelevant for
monetary policy analysis.
The key element behind Guimaraes and Sheedy’s (2011) non-neutrality result
is that in their model sales are strategic substitutes; that is, a firm’s incentive to
have a sale is decreasing in the number of other firms having a sale. For example,
after a particular shock, an individual firm may have an incentive to have a sale
and increase profits coming from bargain hunters. However, if other firms follow
the same strategy, targeting bargain hunters’ demand becomes a more competitive
task, performed at the cost of charging a lower price to loyal customers willing to
acquire the good at high prices. The firm then may find it more profitable to not
have a sale, targeting only its demand from loyal customers.
Guimaraes and Sheedy’s (2011) rationale for sales, then, implies a real rigid-
ity constraining firms’ promotional strategies. As explained in an earlier version of
their paper (Guimaraes and Sheedy, 2008), this strategic substitution implies that,
following an expansionary monetary shock, an individual firm has an incentive to de-
crease sales, therefore increasing its average price. However, if all other firms pursue
the same course of action, bargain hunters’ demand would be relatively neglected,
increasing the returns to targeting non-loyal consumers. Then, in equilibrium, firms
do not adjust sales by much in response to aggregate shocks, and monetary policy
has large real effects.
Guimaraes and Sheedy’s framework thus provides a well structured IO ra-
tionale for sales, consistent with micro price evidence on large amounts on price
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variation due to idiosyncratic factors, and is able to generate realistic individual
price series with inertial regular prices and frequent deviations from reference val-
ues. However, their model implies little adjustment in sales in response to aggregate
shocks, which ends up being critical for their results on monetary non-neutrality.
Is there any evidence on the response of firms’ promotional strategies to aggre-
gate shocks? Chevalier et. al. (2003) use DFF data to study the behavior of prices
in periods of high demand. They identify eight categories of products that a priori
would seem susceptible to seasonal demand shifts, captured by dummy variables
taking the value of 1 on determined holidays, as well as by temperature variables
capturing weather-induced demand cycles. One of their exercises corresponds to
evaluating the response of product advertising (price promotion) to demand peaks.
The authors cite earlier evidence showing that high-demand items are more likely to
be put on sale, and then regress the percentage of category revenues accounted for by
items advertised by Dominick’s against the holiday and temperature high-demand
variables. They find that, in general, seasonally peaking items are significantly more
likely to be placed on sale.19
Even though Chevalier et. al. (2003) focus only on a small number of product
categories (due to data limitations), their study finds evidence that sale promotions
do respond to aggregate shocks, providing some ground for exploring alternatives
19Chevalier et. al. argue that, if market share can be viewed as a proxy for high demand, then
the work of Nelson et. al. (1992) and Hosken and Reiffen (2001) shows a positive correlation
between high-demand and the probability of being put on sale. Hosken and Reiffen (2004) also
presents evidence that high-demand items are more likely to be placed on sale.
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to Guimaraes and Sheedy’s dynamic pricing model.20
Figure 2.5: OUTPUT RESPONSE TO A MONETARY POLICY SHOCK
In the model presented in this document, firms have the alternative of offering
regular and promotional prices at the same time, and randomize between moments
of time in which only the regular price is available and moments of time in which
both prices are available, implying a large amount of price fluctuations even in a de-
terministic scenario as in Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011). Also, as in Guimaraes and
20Working with a more comprehensive dataset (bimonthly observations of the CPI Research
Database), Klenow and Willis (2007) find that sales seem to respond to macro information at least
as much as regular price changes. Given the difficulty to identifying aggregate nominal shocks for
the economy, the authors focus on the expected change in prices based only on current information
about inflation. For this purpose, they regress regular and sale individual prices against a measure
of cumulative inflation since the previous price change, finding that sales are at least as responsive
to recent inflation as are regular price changes.
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Figure 2.7: TIME ALLOCATIONS
HEC time allocations                                                                                                            
(% deviations from steady state values)
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Figure 2.8: THE RESPONSE IN THE MODEL WITH PRICE PROMOTIONS
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(b) Two Equivalent Responses in Terms of Cumulative Effects                                                                                     
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Sheedy’s case, the inclusion of a nominal rigidity in regular prices allows the model
to generate price series showing the type of reference price rigidity recently docu-
mented in the literature, providing also the opportunity of distinguishing between
price quotes and realized prices. As regards effects of monetary policy, however, the
type of price discrimination embedded in this paper provides a new source of price
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flexibility that undermines the effect of nominal rigidities. When a monetary shock
hits the economy and firms are not able to change their regular prices, they have
the option of changing their promotional strategy (the promotional price and the
fraction of time at which this is offered) in order to modify their average sale price.
The key assumption behind this result is that the model’s rationale for sales
relies on the use of price promotions for price discrimination, rather than on the
assumption of customer loyalty. When consumers are given the possibility of en-
dogenously determining the effort they want to invest to take advantage of price
promotions, a new margin is created on the household side of the economy and,
in a general equilibrium setting, firm’s and custumers’ choices interact, generating
the coexistence of regular and promotional prices in a way such that the effects of
nominal rigidities in regular prices are offset by changes in promotional strategies.
In this framework, sale prices end up being important for macroeconomics since
their existence gives the market a way to outsmart the Calvo fairy.
More generally, this result points out the importance of how consumer be-
havior is modelled. Indeed, since different approaches to modeling firm-customer
relationships may perform similarly in replicating features of the microeconomic
data but differ in their macro implications, further exploration of the interaction
between firms and consumers may be a promising task for future research in macroe-
conomics.21
21This line of research includes a wide range of possibilities such as modeling habit persistence
in differentiated goods as in Nakamura and Steinsson (2009), allowing for switching costs when
consumers change sellers as in Kleshchelski and Vincent (2007), and modeling shopping as a search
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2.4 Conclusion
This paper has introduced time looking for price promotions as part of the en-
dogenous set of consumer choices. When price promotions are associated with a
consumer time cost, the economy features the coexistence of regular and promo-
tional prices. The exercise is relevant not only because of the recent evidence on
micro price setting showing that the inclusion or exclusion of sale prices has bearing
on the estimated frequency of price changes, but also because the rationale behind
sale prices may affect the way in which real variables respond to aggregate shocks.
When the model is complemented with a nominal rigidity in regular prices,
individual price series behave in a way consistent with several features of the data:
there is a large amount of price variation not associated with aggregate prices, price
quotes rarely change when price promotions are excluded, and they change very
often when price promotions are included. Moreover, the model allows a distinction
between quoted and realized prices, with realized price series showing the type of
rigidity recently found in studies using scanner data: there is inertia in reference
prices, with frequent fluctuations around the reference price.
Regarding whether price rigidity at the firm level translates into monetary
non-neutrality at the macro level, the results show that the type of price promotion
considered in the model generates a new source of price flexibility that offsets the
effect of nominal rigidity in regular prices. The economy thus features a dynamic
process as in Arsenau and Chugh (2007), Hall (2007), Levin and Yun (2008), and Albrecht et. al.
(2010).
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pricing arrangement in which the market is able to outmaneuver the Calvo fairy.
This result is in contrast with the one recently obtained by Guimaraes and Sheedy
(2011), showing the importance of how consumer behavior and firm-customer inter-
actions are treated in macroeconomic models.
Finally, the results suggest that gathering more empirical evidence on the re-
lationship between price promotions and aggregate prices would be fruitful. How
many goods in the economy are associated with price promotions? How many of
these correspond to “off-shelf” discounts? What types of customer costs are associ-
ated with accessing these promotions and how big are these costs? How much would
these discounts affect estimates of the frequency of price changes? The answers to
these questions could shed further light on the type and degree of price rigidity
observed in the economy and on how this rigidity relates to aggregate fluctuations.
59
Chapter 3
A Quantitative Analysis of Currency Substitution
3.1 Introduction
A striking feature of various emerging and developing economies is the high level of
currency substitution observed even after several years of low inflation. This paper
focuses on two examples of this particular phenomenon: Bolivia and Peru. Data
on the ratio of foreign currency deposits with respect to broad money, used as a
proxy for total currency substitution, shows that the relationship between currency
substitution and inflation is not the same before and after high inflation episodes.
In both countries currency substitution increases with inflation during high inflation
periods and reaches its peak once the economy has been stabilized, showing high
persistence in the subsequent periods in spite of the downward trend in inflation.
60
This persistence is also observed in other Latin American countries, as well
as in many transition economies1. Given that conventional monetary general equi-
librium models cannot generate the hysteresis observed in the data, Uribe (1997)
and Reding and Morales (2004) develop network externalities models that display
low-inflation - high-substitution steady states. Particularly, Uribe’s model proposes
that the cost of buying goods with foreign currency is decreasing in the economy’s
accumulated experience in transacting in the foreign currency. He refers to this
accumulated experience as the economy’s “dollarization capital”.
This chapter explores the quantitative implications of incorporating Uribe’s
dollarization capital idea in a simple endowment economy model in which domes-
tic and foreign currency balances are held because of their services in reducing
transaction costs. Particularly, the model is used to generate a low inflation-high-
substitution equilibrium and to compare the predicted currency substitution ratios
to those observed in the data as well as those obtained using a model in which the
dollarization capital mechanism is not present.
When parameters are chosen as to replicate pre-hyperinflation currency sub-
stitution levels, the model performs well in predicting high levels of currency substi-
tution during high inflation episodes, generating substitution ratios close to the ones
observed in the data. The model also displays inertia in real foreign currency hold-
ings during the transition towards a low-inflation equilibrium and generates higher
levels of currency substitution than a model with no dollarization capital dynamics.
The model generates low inflation currency substitution ratios that are be-
1See Savastano (1996), Valev (2007) and Feige (2003).
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tween 40% and 50% of those observed in post inflation stabilization periods. Al-
though the predicted currency substitution ratios are below the observed ones, the
model is able to explain between 1/6 of the gap between the observed ratios and
the ones generated by a model without dollarization capital dynamics.
The fact that the predicted low-inflation currency substitution ratios are below
the ones observed in the data is a result of sizable post-stabilization impact effects
on domestic currency holdings, a finding that suggests the need for future work on
mechanisms that could induce inertia in domestic currency balances. Particularly,
it would be interesting to study a model that displays uncertainty with respect to
future inflation, probably including a devaluation risk probability as in Mendoza
and Uribe (1999, 2000).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The second Section describes
the pre and post high-inflation pattern of currency substitution in Bolivia and Peru.
The theoretical model is presented in the third section and solved in the fourth
section. The fifth section concludes.
3.2 Currency Substitution in Two Selected Economies
3.2.1 Currency substitution and inflation
The first challenge in analyzing currency substitution in developing countries is con-
structing a relevant measure of the use of foreign currency in the domestic economy,
often a difficult task because of the lack of data on the amount of foreign currency
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held by households outside the financial system. Following Savastano (1996), a
useful proxy for the total level of currency substitution in the economy is the ra-
tio of foreign currency deposits (FCDs) to broad money. This measure, labeled
FCD/BM∗, is represented by the dark gray areas in the left hand panels of Figure
3.1.2 The graphs also depict the behavior of the inflation rate (in logarithmic scale
for Bolivia and Peru).
In the Bolivian case, this measure of currency substitution is not available for
the 1981-1984 period when the central government imposed restrictions on the use of
foreign currency in the financial system, forcing the conversion of all bank liabilities
into domestic currency. Therefore, this measure does not provide information on
the behavior of currency substitution during the hyperinflation period of the early
eighties. When observing the 1985-2007 period, it is interesting to notice that the
substitution ratio reached its peak in 1995 after several years of reductions in the
annual inflation rate, and decreased after that, even in the 2002-2008 period during
which the inflation rate gradually rose.
Peruvian currency substitution follows a similar behavior. The substitution
ratio was already high before 1988, with a 50% average for 1980-1987. The sharp
decrease observed between 1984 and 1987 is related to the temporary prohibition
2The broad money measure varies depending on the monetary aggregates classification used
by each Central Bank. In the case of Bolivia the measure is constructed as the ratio of FCDs to
M3’, the broadest monetary aggregate used by the Bolivian Central Bank, which includes short
term and long term deposits denominated in local and foreign currency. In the cases of Peru , the
measure is computed as the ratio of quasi-money denominated in foreign currency to total money
and quasi-money.
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of U.S. dollar denominated deposits (Rojas-Suarez, 1992). As in the Bolivian case,
restrictions on FCDs limit the capacity of this measure to reflect the relationship
between inflation and currency substitution during hyperinflation episodes. During
the post-restrictions period (1990 onwards) currency substitution remained high,
achieving its peak in 1993 and showing a slow downward trend after that.
Again following Savastano (1996), data limitations due to restrictions on FCDs
in the domestic financial system in Bolivia and Peru can be addressed by combining
the FCD/BM∗ substitution measure with information on foreign currency deposits
held abroad (da). This new measure, labeled (FCD+da)/(BM∗+da), is represented
by the light gray areas in the left hand panels of Figure 3.1. The measure was
constructed using data on bank net foreign asset positions available at the Bank
of International Settlements (BIS), taking the series of liabilities of BIS reporting
banks against each country, converting them into domestic currency and adding
them to the numerator and denominator of FCD/BM∗.3
The new and broader measure provides a clearer picture of the currency substi-
tution - inflation relationship before and after hyperinflationary periods. In Bolivia,
the broader substitution ratio was already high in 1980 (38%) and increased to 56%
at the peak of the hyperinflation episode in 1985, the same year in which FCD
restrictions were eliminated. Currency substitution continued rising even after the
hyperinflation period ended, reaching a maximum of 83% in 1995. The reduction
in the distance between the two substitution measures during the 1988-2008 pe-
3BIS Banking Statistics. Table 6A: External positions of reporting banks vis--vis individual
countries, vis--vis all sectors.
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Figure 3.1: CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION IN BOLIVIA AND PERU
riod shows that as inflation was controlled and continually reduced, domestic agents
changed the composition of their portfolios from assets held abroad to assets held
in the domestic banking sector, but with little change in the currency composition
of their monetary assets, relying heavily on FCDs.
A similar pattern is observed in Peru, where both inflation and the broader sub-
stitution measure were already high in the pre-hyperinflation period. The broader
ratio increased with inflation in the 1987-1990 period, and reached its peak in 1993,
by which time inflation already presented a marked downward trend. As in the Bo-
livian case, once FCD restrictions were eliminated (1990) the portfolio composition
shifted towards domestically held deposits, but with the currency composition still
leaning towards U.S. dollar denominated monetary assets.
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Thus, the left-hand side panels in Figure 3.1 summarize the first main stylized
fact that motivates the quantitative work presented later in the document: while
dollarization increases quickly with inflation during high-inflation periods, it does
not quickly revert once inflation has been reduced and does not present a clear co-
movement with inflation in the post-stabilization years.
3.2.2 Inverse velocities of money
This section describes the behavior of the Bolivian and Peruvian financial systems
by constructing different inverse velocities of money as proxies of financial deepness.
Each of the right-hand side panels in Figure 3.1 presents inflation (in logarithmic
scale) and the inverse of three money velocity ratios: i) M/GDP , money over GDP,
ii) BM/GDP , broad money over GDP, and iii) BM∗/GDP , broad money including
foreign currency deposits over GDP.4
The top right panel shows a sharp decline in monetization ratios during the Bo-
livian hyperinflation years (1984-1985); once that inflation was controlled and FCD
restrictions lifted, the inverse velocities of money in domestic currency remained
relatively low for several years, while BM∗/GDP increased strongly until reaching
a peak in 2001 (54%). The domestic currency ratios (M/GDP and BM/GDP ) in-
creased in the 2004-2008 period, but this was not joined by a decrease in BM∗/GDP
which increased from 43% in 2004 to 51% in 2007.
4Bolivia: M/GDP = M1/GDP, BM=M2/GDP, BM* = M3’/GDP. Peru: M/GDP =
Money/GDP, BM = (Money + Quasimoney)/GDP, BM* = (Money + Quasimoney in domes-
tic and foreign currency)/GDP. See Appendix 2.
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In the case of Peru, there was a marked reduction in the three monetary ratios
during the hyperinflation period, followed by a strong increase in BM∗/GDP after
inflation was controlled and FCD restrictions eliminated. While both domestic
currency inverse velocities followed an increasing trend, they remained well below
BM∗/GDP which reached its historical peak of 30% in 2008.
Overall, the right-hand side panels in Figure 3.1 summarize the second main
stylized fact of interest in this document: if the inverse velocities of money presented
in Figure 3.1 are understood as proxies of financial deepness, then the graphs show
that after high inflation episodes, the financial system recovery relies strongly on
the use of the foreign currency. After the sharp decrease in monetization ratios,
the post-hyperinflation financial sectors were rebuilt on the basis of the U.S. dollar
instead of the national currency.
The next section presents a simple perfect foresight model that seeks to capture
the above mentioned stylized facts by introducing an accumulation externality in
the use of the foreign currency.
3.3 A Model of Currency Substitution
The stylized facts analyzed in the previous section show that the relationship be-
tween currency substitution and inflation follows different patterns in pre-stabilization
and post-stabilization periods, a type of asymmetry that is not captured by standard
monetary general equilibrium models.
Motivated by the high degree of persistence in currency substitution observed
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in several developing countries, Uribe (1997) develops a cash in advance model in
which the cost of buying goods with foreign currency is decreasing in the economy’s
accumulated experience in transacting in foreign currency, a concept that Uribe calls
the economy’s dollarization capital. Uribe’s framework delivers the possibility of an
equilibrium in which the foreign currency circulates even in a low inflation steady
state.
Building on Uribe’s work, Reding and Morales (2004) replace the exogenous
dollarization capital assumption by modeling endogenous network externality effects
in which the size of the foreign currency network increases with the number of agents
whose foreign currency balances are larger than a given threshold. Their model also
renders the possibility of high-substitution - low-inflation equilibria by combining a
learning effect (the acquisition of experience in the use of an alternative currency)
with a size effect (the reduction in transaction costs caused by an increase in the
number of agents with significant foreign currency balances).
Both of these works present heterogeneous agent models with complex dynam-
ics and are not solved computationally. This section develops a simple representative
agent monetary model incorporating Uribe’s (1997) dollarization capital idea; the
model is then solved using numerical methods.
3.3.1 Preferences
Consider a perfect foresight endowment economy with income yt = y in every period





where β is the inter-temporal discount factor, u′(ct) > 0 and u
′′(ct) < 0.
3.3.2 Monetary Policy
The economy is open. It follows a predetermined exchange rate regime and the
law of one price holds at any moment in time. That is, the nominal exchange rate
St is given by St = pt/p
∗
t , where pt and p
∗
t , are the domestic and international
price levels respectively. Therefore inflation is given by πt = εt + π
∗ where ε is the
policy-determined devaluation rate and π∗ is international inflation.
Each period the government injects money in the economy through a transfer
Tt = Mt+1 −Mt, where Mt are nominal money balances. The transfer is such that
it satisfies the law of one price and the model equilibrium conditions that will be
derived below.
The agent uses her resources either in consumption (ct) or in acquiring domes-




Money enters into the model because of its transaction cost reduction services. Each


















are domestic and foreign real money balances respectively.5




The transaction cost reduction services provided by domestic currency real
balances are given by θ(mt
pt
) with θ′ > 0, while the cost reduction services derived







is the economy’s accumulated experience in using foreign currency (the dollarization
capital) and θ∗m∗t /p∗t > 0 , θ
∗
d > 0.




























I assume that the transaction cost reduction services provided by foreign currency
depend not only on the amount of foreign currency real balances, but on the ac-
cumulated experience using this currency. The dollarization capital depreciates at
an exogenous rate (δ̃) and its accumulation is an increasing function of the current
level of currency substitution.









with G′(.) > 0 and G′′(.) < 0.










currency balances expressed in real terms.
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, the consumer’s problem is maximizing (3.1) subject
to (3.2) and (3.3), with first order conditions given by
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1 + φc(t+ 1)
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where γt is the multiplier on the dollarization capital accumulation equation,
the expression (t) is used to denote that all the arguments of a given function are






t−1. Finally, when imposing market












= y − ct − φ (t) (3.7)
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Notice that if the international price is normalized to one, π∗t = 0 and this last
equation is reduced to
a∗t − a∗t−1 = [y − φ (t)]− ct (3.8)
that is, an increase in real foreign currency balances held by domestic agents
is financed through a trade balance surplus, with the trade balance defined as the
difference between output net of transaction costs, y − φ (t), and consumption.
Then, the model’s competitive equilibrium is defined as a list of sequences
for consumption and dollarization capital {ct, dt}, portfolio choices {mt,m∗t}, prices
{pt, p∗t}, and policy variables {Mt, εt} such that: i) Equations (3.2), (3.3), (3.4),
(3.5) and (3.6) solve the representative agent’s consumption maximization problem,
ii) the monetary market clears (Mt = mt) and iii) the Law of One Price is satisfied
in every period.
The intuition behind the first order conditions of the model is better under-
stood by considering first the case of a model without dollarization capital. The
equilibrium conditions of such a model correspond to equations (3.4), (3.5) and
(3.11), setting γt = 0 and normalizing dt to one:
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= y − ct − φ (t) (3.11)
The left hand side of (3.9) is the marginal utility consuming one less unit of
the good in period t and using those resources to increase domestic real balances at
t+ 1. In t+ 1 these extra real balances are used for consumption, and the marginal
utility of this future consumption is properly discounted by domestic inflation and
the marginal increase in transaction costs φc (t+ 1) . This expression is equated to
the marginal utility of consuming the good in period t (right hand side of (3.9)),
adjusted by the increase in transaction costs caused by additional consumption and
by the opportunity cost of not carrying an extra unit of domestic real balances to the
next period. This opportunity cost equals the marginal reduction in the transaction
cost from carrying domestic real balances from period t to period t + 1 (remember
that φθ (t) is negative).
A similar interpretation is given to equation (3.10), where the left hand side is
the marginal utility of carrying a unit of foreign currency real balances to the next
period, while the right hand side is the marginal utility of consuming a unit of the
good in the current period, including the increase in transaction costs caused by
additional current consumption and by having one less unit of foreign real balances
carried to the next period.
Combining (3.9) and (3.10):
1 + φθ∗ (t) θa∗ (t)






Equation (3.12) summarizes how the agent’s currency portfolio composition is
affected by domestic and foreign inflation in a model with no dollarization capital.
When πt = π
∗
t , the opportunity cost (in transaction cost reduction terms) of not
carrying a unit of domestic real balances (φθ (t) θ
′ (t)) is equal, at an optimum, to
the opportunity cost of not carrying a unit of foreign real balances (φθ∗ (t) θa∗ (t)).
When πt+1 > π
∗
t+1 ≥ −1 however, 1 + φθ∗(t)θa∗(t) > 1 + φθ(t)θ′(t).
Thus, in the absence of dollarization capital dynamics, discrepancies between
domestic and foreign inflation are immediately translated into changes in the current
composition of the agent’s real balances portfolio.
When endogenous accumulation of dollarization capital is introduced in the
model, the equivalent of equation (3.12) is found by combining (3.4) and (3.5):
u′(t)
1+φc(t)
(1 + φθ∗ (t) θ
∗
a∗ (t))− γtG′ (t) at(a∗t+at)2
u′(t)
1+φc(t)








This last expression implies new trade-offs not present in (3.12). When πt+1 =
π∗t+1, (3.13) is reduced to:
u′ (t)
1 + φc (t)
[φθ∗ (t) θ
∗





where this last expression equates the marginal value of increasing the dollar-
ization capital by holding a higher proportion of foreign real balances (right-hand
side of 3.14) with the forgone marginal utility gain from reducing transaction costs
by holding domestic balances over foreign ones and then spending the proceedings
on consumption (left-hand side of 3.14, recalling that φθ∗ (t) θ
∗




In the absence of dollarization capital dynamics, the term in square brack-
ets on the left-hand side of (3.14) would be zero when πt+1 = π
∗
t+1 (see equation
3.12), but now it is positive at an optimum. That is, the model with dollarization
capital dynamics requires higher marginal transaction cost reduction services from
holding domestic currency balances than would be required in a framework without
dollarization capital (| φθ (t) θ′ (t) |>| φθ∗ (t) θa∗ (t) |).
This framework thus introduces inertia through a substitution motive not
present in the model without dollarization capital. Suppose that dollarization (the
proportion of foreign real balances with respect to total real balances , a∗t/(a
∗
t + at))
decreases. Then, for a given {γt, ct} pair, this would imply an increase in the right
hand side of (3.14) because of the strict concavity of G(t). This, in turn, implies
broadening the gap between | φθ (t) θ′ (t) | and | φθ∗ (t) θa∗ (t) | ( left hand side of
(3.14) ), implying an increase in a∗t and a decline in at.
3.4 IV. Solving the Model
3.4.1 Parametrization and Solution Method










ct; ϕ > 0
θ (t) = (at)
η ; η ∈ (0, 1)
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The functional form for the transaction cost term is similar to that used in





Table 3.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Source Calibration
Target
Bolivia Peru





σ > 0 1.5 1.5 Reinhart and
Vegh (95)
-




















δ̃ ∈ (0, 1) 0.521 0.777 Calibrated d = 1
C = Private Consumption
NCSR = Numerator in Currency Substitution Ratio (CSR)
DCSR = Denominator in CSR
1
Given the predetermined exchange rate regime and normalizing p∗ to one, the
inflation rate is given by the devaluation rate, εt = ε, taken as a policy parame-
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Table 3.2: Model Results and Calibration Targets
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ter that determines each steady state. The solution method consists of linearizing
equations (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), (3.6) and (3.11) around alternative steady states using
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe’s (2004) perturbation algorithm.
Regarding the values chosen for each parameter, y is normalized to one, while
β is set at a standard value of 0.96. σ is set at 1.5, in the middle of the range used in
Mendoza’s (1991) study on real business cycles in small open economies; this value
is also within the range estimated by Reinhart and Vegh (1995). Two sets of values
for ϕ, ω, η and δ̃ are chosen to replicate the pre-hyperinflation currency substitution
ratio in Bolivia and Peru.
The values for {ϕ, ω, η, δ̃} are jointly determined to match four calibration
targets: first, a consumption-output ratio (c/y) equal to the observed consumption-
GDP ratio in the pre-hyperinflation period (1980-1981); second, a foreign real bal-
ances–output ratio (a∗/y) equal to the observed (FCD + da)/NGDP ratio in the
pre-hyperinflation period, where NGDP stands for nominal GDP, FCD stands for
foreign currency deposits and da stands for deposits held abroad; third, a domestic
real balances-output ratio (a/y) equal to the observed (BM∗ − FCD)/GDP ratio
in the pre-hyperinflation period, where BM∗ is the broad money measure used in
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Section II; fourth, a dollarization capital value equal to one.
By setting the above mentioned targets for a∗/y and a/y, the model’s ratio






) corresponds to the ratio between
the numerator of the currency substitution measure used in Section II and nominal
GDP (that is, the ratio of foreign currency monetary assets to nominal GDP), while





the ratio of the difference between the denominator and numerator terms of the
currency substitution measure used in Section II to nominal GDP (that is, the ratio
of domestic currency monetary assets to nominal GDP). Given these targets, the
model’s ratio of foreign real monetary assets to total monetary assets (a∗/(a∗ + a))
corresponds to the observed currency substitution measure discussed in Section II
((FCD + da)/(BM∗ + da)).
The target for dt is chosen to generate some similarity between the model’s
pre-hyperinflation equilibrium and that obtained in a model with no dollarization
capital dynamics.
In the two cases the value for η is restricted to be greater than 1/2 in order to
ensure that domestic real balances are greater than foreign currency when πt+1 =
π∗t+1 and when there is no dollarization capital. To see this notice that under the
current functional forms equation (3.12) implies at
a∗t
= η
1−η when πt+1 = π
∗
t+1, and
η > 1/2 ensures at¿a
∗
t .
The four sets of parameter values are reported in Table 3.1. Table 3.2 presents
the observed and model-generated values for each calibration target.
Table 3.3 shows the performance of the model in matching the observed degree
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of currency substitution during hyperinflation episodes.
Table 3.3: Currency Substitution Ratios in High-inflation Periods
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The average value of Bolivian inflation for the 1982-1985 period was 2700%.
When inflation is set at this value, the result is a 53% increase in dollarization
capital and a currency substitution ratio of 70%, a little higher than the average
between the ratio observed at the peak of the hyperinflation and the one observed
one period after the hyperinflation.
In the case of Peru, the average inflation rate for the hyperinflation period
(1988-1991) was 4000%. When the model is solved for this inflation rate, the dollar-
ization capital level increases by 12% with respect to the pre-hyperinflation period
and the currency substitution ratio is 74%, seven to eight percentage points below
the observed ratio.
3.4.2 Transitional Dynamics from High to Low inflation
As shown in Table 3.3, the model performs well in terms of generating high dol-
larization ratios for large values of inflation. The model can also be used to study
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transitional dynamics from a high-inflation steady state to a low-inflation one. Fig-
ure 3.2 presents impact and transitional effects of reducing inflation from 2700% (the
Bolivian post-hyperinflation value) to 24% (the Bolivian pre-hyperinflation value),
and from 4000% (the Peruvian post-hyperinflation value) to 90% (the Peruvian pre-
hyperinflation value). All series are expressed as percentage deviations from the
original steady state.
The adjustment in dollarization capital is slow, taking more than three years
in every case, and the rapid adjustment in currency portfolios is mainly due to sharp
changes in domestic currency balances. The much slower and less sizable adjustment
in foreign currency balances is directly related to the inertia observed in dollarization
capital dynamics. Currency substitution dynamics are shown in the third graph in
each panel, with a high impact effect explained by the quick adjustment in domestic
currency balances.
Since money enters the model through a transaction cost function, the reduc-
tion in inflation has a positive effect on consumption and therefore utility.











































































































































































a) Parameters set as to obtain the Bolivian pre-hyperinflation currency substitution ratio
Figure 2: Transitional Dynamics from High-Inflation to Low-Inflation Equilibrium
Dollarization Capital, d
Money Balances                                 
a (-, left axis) a*(--, right axis) Currency Substitution, a/(a+a*)
  fl i  t  -I fl ti  ili ri
Consumption, c
b) Parameters set as to obtain the Peruvian pre-hyperinflation currency substitution ratio
Dollarization Capital, d
Money Balances                                 
a (-, left axis) a*(--, right axis) Currency Substitution, a/(a+a*)




How does the model perform compared to one in which there is no dollarization
capital? This question is answered by analyzing currency substitution transitional
dynamics from the high-inflation steady state to one in which inflation equals the
post-stabilization average. Panel a) in Figure 3.3 corresponds to a reduction in
inflation from 2700% (the Bolivian hyperinflation average) to 11% (the Bolivian post
stabilization average), while panel b) corresponds to a reduction in inflation from
4000% (the Peruvian hyperinflation average) to 17% (the Peruvian post stabilization
average). Solid lines are used for the model with dollarization capital, while dashed
lines are used for the model with no dollarization capital6. In all cases the initial
value is set at the high inflation steady state in the model with dollarization capital.
As expected, the dollarization capital model delivers higher post-stabilization
ratios than those obtained with the model without dollarization capital.4. Panels
a.1) to b.2) show the transition paths of domestic and foreign real balances. In the
model with no dollarization capital foreign balances fall with respect to their levels
in the previous equilibrium while they increase when dollarization capital is added
to the model. However, as mentioned earlier, in both models the dynamics of the
currency substitution ratio are not driven by the adjustment in foreign balances but
by quick and very sizable variations in domestic balances.
The currency substitution ratios of the model with dollarization capital are
below the observed ratios, but still represent a large increase with respect to a more
conventional model with no dollarization capital dynamics. The ratios generated
by the dollarization capital model are between 40% and 50% of the observed ratios,
6Dollarization capital dynamics are shut down by setting δ̃ = 1 and ω = 0
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 Inflation drops from 2700% (Bolivian 1982-1985 
average) to 11% (Bolivian 1986-2008 average)
Inflation drops from 3100% (Peruvian 1988-1991 
average) to 17% (Peruvian 1992-2008 average)
a) Currency Substitution Ratio b) Currency Substitution Ratio
 
a.1) a as % of st. st. value b.1) a as % of st. st. value
a.2) a* as % of st. st. value b.2) a* as % of st. st. value
Solid line: model with dollarization capital     Dotted line: model with no dollarization capital
explaining 1/6 of the gap between the observed currency substitution ratios and
those obtained with a model with no dollarization capital.
This is seen in Table 3.4, where the first three columns in each panel present the
post-stabilization currency substitution ratios obtained by models with and without
dollarization capital, as well as the observed ratios. The fourth column presents
the ratio between the difference in predicted currency substitution ratios with and
without dollarization capital and the difference between the observed ratio and the
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Table 3.4: Currency Substitution Ratios in High-inflation Periods
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one generated by the model without dollarization capital.
Overall, the dollarization capital framework delivers high post-stabilization
substitution ratios using a very simple structure, and leaving ample room for further
additions to the model dynamics. These additions could focus on generating inertia
in the adjustment process for domestic currency holdings in a way consistent with
the behavior of the inverse velocities of money discussed in Section II. An interesting
line of work in this regard would be the introduction of uncertainty about the future
value of inflation, by assigning a policy reversal probability as part of the agent’s
information set as in Mendoza and Uribe (1999,2000)7.
7In the predetermined exchange rate regime environment of the present document, this fea-
ture could be added to the model by introducing a post-stabilization time-dependent devaluation
probability as in Mendoza and Uribe (2000), or by making this probability an endogenous variable
conditioned on foreign reserves as in Mendoza and Uribe (1999).
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3.5 Conclusion
The present document has developed a simple endowment-economy monetary model
able to generate high levels of currency substitution in low inflation environments.
The introduction of a dollarization capital variable to capture the economy’s accu-
mulated experience in the use of foreign currency generates a motive for holding
foreign currency balances even when inflation is low.
When applied to high-inflation equilibria, the model is able to generate cur-
rency substitution ratios very close to those observed during hyperinflation episodes,
and it presents inertia in foreign currency real balances during the adjustment to-
wards a low-inflation steady state.
In terms of the model’s predicted post-hyperinflation dollarization levels, these
are still below the observed ratios but represent a sizable increase with respect
to those obtained using a more standard framework with no dollarization capital.
The dollarization capital model generates post-hyperinflation currency substitution
ratios that are between 40% and 50% of the observed ratios and is able to explain
1/6 of the gap between the observed substitution ratios and those generated by a
model with no dollarization capital dynamics.
Further model building efforts could focus on introducing frictions that reduce
the size of impact effects on post-stabilization domestic currency holdings. An
important step in this direction may be the introduction of devaluation risk dynamics
along the lines of Mendoza and Uribe (1999, 2000).
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Chapter 4
Investment Activity in the Financial Sector and
the Relationship between Inflation and Currency
Substitution
4.1 Introduction
As shown in the previous chapter, the dollarization capital model generates a higher
steady state currency substitution ratio than that obtained with a model with no
dollarization capital in it. There are, however, three important limitations that affect
the model’s ability to study currency substitution dynamics. First, the dollarization
capital variable was introduced in an ad hoc manner as a stock variable entering the
transaction cost function. Second, the model has a representative household, and
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the dollarization capital variable is optimally chosen by the consumer taking into
account an accumulation law of motion in which dollarization capital increases with
the currency substitution ratio. In this environment, the consumer fully internalizes
the effect of currency substitution on the dollarization capital variable, leaving no
room for network externality effects like the ones developed in Uribe (1997) and
Reding and Morales (2004). Third, the model is not able to generate an asymmetric
relationship between inflation and currency substitution before and after high infla-
tion episodes. This behavior is at odds with the data in several partially dollarized
economies.
This chapter presents a framework that provides a micro foundation for a
quantitative model able to deal with the above mentioned limitations. Developing
and solving such a model is beyond the scope of this chapter. The chapter rather
focuses on exploring the theoretical elements needed to generate different inflation-
substitution patterns before and after high inflation episodes. The main idea is
that in an environment in which consumers show some heterogeneity in their ability
to access the financial sector’s money exchange services, a sufficiently high level
of inflation can induce the financial sector to make a fixed cost investment that
decreases this heterogeneity by permanently reducing money exchange costs.
More formally, this chapter presents a simple model of two consumers who
use money to buy a consumption good. The consumers can hold either domestic or
foreign currency, but they do not have the technology to transform domestic balances
for foreign ones, so to do so they must use a money exchange point owned by the
financial sector. The only difference between consumers is that they may be located
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at different distances from the nearest exchange point, and they obtain disutility
from walking that distance. The financial sector provides only one service, money
exchange, and decides on whether or not to construct money exchange points at a
given fixed cost. The financial sector makes its optimal exchange point construction
decision anticipating the consumers’ substitution decisions under different levels of
inflation. For sufficiently high levels of inflation, the financial sector will construct
new exchange points, changing consumers’ distance to the closest exchange point
and therefore permanently reducing currency substitution costs.
It could be said then that in this framework the dollarization capital variable
corresponds to the number of exchange points set by the financial sector. This seems
like a plausible example of the type of investment decisions made by the financial sec-
tor in developing countries as agents increase their usage of foreign currency. Think,
for example, of a bank in a high-inflation developing country deciding on whether
to offer money exchange services in some or all of its agencies. Provided that there
are no legal restrictions, the bank may also decide to offer foreign currency high liq-
uidity services (i.e. checking accounts denominated in dollars), an action that may
be associated with different types of one-time costs, such as training personnel in
the use of the foreign currency and setting up accounting and software systems that
handle both currencies. For an example directly related to the concepts of distance
and accessibility, think of banks investing in ATM machines and deciding whether
to provide ATM services only in domestic currency or allowing them to work in
foreign currency as well. The financial system may be willing to pay these invest-
ment costs during periods of high inflation (or of high inflation expectations) with
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the purpose of taking advantage of the increase in household’s demand for foreign
currency. However, this investment permanently reduces household’s costs in terms
of accessing foreign currency services and therefore induces currency substitution at
lower levels of inflation in the future.
The combination of consumer heterogeneity and fixed costs in exchange point
construction generate inflation regions with different intensities in terms of invest-
ment in new exchange points. Particularly, starting from a state in which there are
no exchange points in the economy, an episode of high inflation will push the finan-
cial sector into action in terms of expanding the economy’s dollarization capital, by
installing one exchange point which will be more closely located to one consumer
than to the other. For a sufficiently high inflation rate, both consumers will be
willing to walk to the exchange point, therefore eliminating any incentive of the
financial sector to invest in a second exchange point. If in subsequent periods infla-
tion declines to a level that is low enough to discourage the more distant consumer
from walking to the exchange point, the financial sector will have an incentive to
invest in a second money exchange point. This decision will locate both consumers
at the same distance from an exchange point, eliminating heterogeneity in terms of
access to financial services, and lowering the inflation threshold at which the second
consumer is willing to substitute foreign for domestic currency. Thus, the model
presented here is able to generate an equilibrium in which the relationship between
inflation and currency substitution is path dependent and differs before and after
periods of high inflation.
From a theoretical point of view, the work presented here constitutes a step
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along the lines of Guidotti and Rodrigues (1992), Uribe (1997) and Reding and
Morales (2004) in terms explaining non-linearities in the relationship between in-
flation and currency substitution. Guidotti and Rodrigues (1992) present a model
in which agents may choose the currency in which purchases are denominated, but
they must pay a cost every time they decide to switch the currency denomination of
their transactions. Switching is optimal when the inflation rate is sufficiently high;
when inflation drops back to a low level, inaction becomes optimal, generating a
low-inflation - high-currency-substitution equilibrium.
Uribe (1997) remarks that Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992) ignores the possi-
bility that hysteresis in currency substitution is likely to involve network effects.
Therefore, he develops a model in which the economy’s accumulated experience in
using a foreign currency as a means of payment reduces the cost of buying goods
with foreign currency. Chapter 3 of this dissertation studies a model similar to
Uribe’s but solved computationally. Uribe models this accumulated experience in
using a foreign currency as a dollarization capital variable that is strictly increasing
in the degree of dollarization of the economy.
Reding and Morales (2004) depart from Uribe’s approach by not relying on a
dollarization capital variable with exogenous dynamics, but rather trying to model
explicitly the network effects related to the use of foreign currency. They assume
agents are heterogeneous with respect to the transaction cost they face when they
wish to use foreign currency as a means of payment. In turn, this cost is decreasing
in the size of a foreign currency network, comprised of all agents whose balances in
dollars are higher than an exogenous threshold.
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The framework presented here can be seen as an effort to provide a micro
foundation for the emergence and functioning of such a foreign currency network.
This is done by considering an aspect not studied in the papers described so far: the
role of the financial sector in developing the economy’s dollarization capital. When
thinking about the experience of several partially dollarized developing countries, it
seems that the emergence of a network of foreign currency users is highly affected
by the decision of the financial sector to provide services in foreign currency. As
mentioned earlier, this is very likely to be associated with different types of invest-
ment costs (some of them fixed). In the model presented here, a network of foreign
currency users emerges only after the financial sector has made the proper sunk
investment.
In this context, and in contrast to Uribe (1997), the economy’s dollarization
capital corresponds to actual physical capital (the number of available exchange
points), and, in contrast to Reding and Morales (2004), the currency substitution
network is not composed of agents that have foreign currency holdings above some
exogenous level, but by the financial sector and those agents that have access to
money exchange services. Further, whether an agent has access to financial sec-
tor services or not depends on the consumer’s endogenous inflation threshold for
currency substitution and on the financial sector’s endogenous optimal investment
decision.
Network expansion effects, then, are the result of interactions between opti-
mal decisions on the consumer side and on the financial sector side. Consumers
define their substitution behavior based on the level of inflation and the availability
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of exchange points (the level of dollarization capital), and do not internalize the
impact that their demand for currency exchange services may have on the financial
sector’s decision to expand the number of exchange points. The financial sector
makes its optimal investment decision based on the potential demand that it would
face if consumers had access to the proper level of dollarization capital (the profit
maximizing number of exchange points).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The second section presents a
simple three agent model used to study the consumer’s optimal currency substitution
behavior and the financial sector’s optimal dollarization capital investment decision.
The third section concludes.
4.2 A simple three-agent model
4.2.1 The environment
The world consists of a local economy given by a horizontal space of measure one,
as depicted in the top panel of Figure 4.1, and an external economy (the rest of the
world). Prices in the local economy are not necessarily the same as those of the
rest of the world. There are three agents in the local economy: a financial sector
that provides only one service, money exchange, and two consumers that start each
period located on positions one and two. If these consumers want to acquire foreign
currency they need to walk to the closest money exchange point constructed by the
financial sector. There can be at most two exchange points, and these can only be
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located in positions A and B.
Figure 4.1: MODEL ENVIRONMENT
4.2.2 Consumer’s problem
Each period consumers derive utility from consumption and disutility from walked
distance. Preferences then are given by
u(c)− v(D)
Where u(·) and v(·) are strictly increasing Bernoulli utility functions, c is
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consumption and D is walked distance. The consumer’s problem is an intratemporal
one, so time subscripts are ignored for simplicity.
Each period starts with an initial price level (PI) and finishes with a final
price level (PF ). At the beginning of each period, each consumer receives a real
endowment y. As mentioned above, consumers receive utility from consumption
and it is assumed that they need domestic money to buy the consumption good.
That is, consumers cannot directly change their endowment y for consumption,
but need money in order to perform the transaction. Therefore, after receiving
their real endowment, consumers change it for nominal balances; at the end of the
period, these balances are used to buy the consumption good. For simplicity, it is
assumed that there is no savings technology; therefore, at the end of each period
all currency balances must be exchanged for the consumption good. Then, the
consumer’s problem consists solely of choosing the currency denomination of the
nominal balances that she holds within the period.
The sequence of actions is clarified by the graph presented in the second panel
of Figure 4.1. The consumer starts the period with a real endowment y, which is
immediately exchanged for domestic money at the initial price level. If the consumer
has access to the money exchange services provided by the financial sector (that is,
if there is a money exchange point located either at position A or B or both), the
consumer decides whether to keep these domestic currency balances or change them
for foreign currency. If she chooses not to substitute, then the consumer gets to the
end of the period with the initial amount of domestic money holdings and uses them
to finance consumption at the end of period price level. In this case the consumer’s
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utility is given by u(c)− v(0).
If the consumer instead decides to hold foreign currency balances, she needs
to walk to the closest available money exchange point (located at distance D = d
or D = 2d). There she pays a real fee f in order to change her domestic currency
balances for foreign ones that she holds until the end of the period, when these are
once again changed for domestic money and used to finance consumption. In this
case the consumer’s utility is u(c)− v(D).
Let ξ be the set of positions where the financial sector has built a money
exchange point. Then, the consumers’ substitution decision can be analyzed under
three case: no exchange points, ξ = {}, one exchange point, ξ = {A} or ξ = {B},
and two exchange points, ξ = {A,B}.
Case 1. No Exchange Points Available, ξ = {}
This is a trivial problem since none of the consumers has a choice on the denomi-
nation of her currency holdings.
At the beginning of each period, each consumer receives the real endowment
y, which she changes for money holdings MI = yPI , where PI is the beginning-of-
period domestic price level. At the end of the period, these money holdings are used
to finance real consumption c = MI
PF
, where PF is the end-of-period domestic price
level. Define gross inflation, 1 + π = PF
PI
. Then, real consumption in terms of the




and the consumer’s utility in




Case 2 One exchange point available, ξ = {A} or ξ = {B}
Consider the case in which there is a money exchange point available at point A.
Let’s start by considering agent one, who is closest to A. After exchanging its real
endowment y for money balances MI = yPI , the agent must decide whether to
substitute MI for foreign currency or not. As derived in Case 1, if she decides not
to substitute her utility will be u( y
1+π
)− v(0).
If she wants to substitute MI for foreign currency, she first needs to walk to the
exchange point, deriving disutility v(d), and then pay a real fee γy, γ ∈ (0, 1), before
obtaining M∗ = S−1I (M − γyPI), where SI =
PI
P ∗I
is the initial nominal exchange
rate and P ∗I is the begeining-of-period foreign price level. Then, foreign currency
holdings are given by M∗ = (1 − γ)yP ∗I . At the end of the period M∗ is changed





1+π∗ , where the consumer’s utility is u(
(1−γ)y
1+π∗ )− v(d).





1 if consumer 1 substitutes
0 otherwise
Then, consumer 1’s currency substitution problem is
U = max
s1
[U subst, Uno subst] (4.1)








Consumer 2’s problem is analogous, but with a lower utility payoff when sub-
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stituting local for domestic currency balances:
U = max
s2
[U subst, Uno subst] (4.2)








Then, in each period consumers one and two will substitute domestic for for-











)− v(2d) > u( y
1 + π
)− v(0) (4.4)
For a given level of foreign inflation, π∗, these two conditions implicitly define










)− v(2d) > u( y
1 + π2
)− v(0) (4.6)
For simplicity, consider the case of linear utility u(c) = c, v(D) = D. Then








(1− γ)y − 2d(1 + π∗)
− 1 (4.8)
As expected, the inflation threshold increases with the cost of accessing the
money exchange services provided by the financial sector, and therefore agent two,
who has a longer distance to walk to the nearest money exchange point, has a greater
threshold than that of agent one.
Case 3. Two exchange points available, ξ = {A,B}
In this case both consumers are at distance d from the nearest money exchange
point, and therefore they face the same problem as consumer one in the ξ = {A,B}
case, with both consumers willing to substitute foreign for domestic currency when
π >= π1.
Figure 4.2 shows the relationship between inflation and currency substitution
in the three cases ξ = {}, ξ = {A} or ξ = {B}, and ξ = {A,B}.
Define the economy’s end of period currency substitution ratio (CSR) as the
ratio between foreign currency holdings evaluated at SF and total money holdings
before consumption. When there are no exchange points available, this ratio is zero
for every level of inflation. When there is one exchange point available, only one
consumer substitutes domestic for foreign currency when inflation is greater than π1
but smaller than π2. Then, before consumption, this consumer holds SFM
∗ money
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. When inflation is above π2, both consumers hold SFM
∗, so the
economy’s currency substitution ratio is 2SFM
∗
2SFM∗
= 1. π1 and π2 correspond to levels
of inflation at which either one or both consumers are indifferent between holding
domestic or foreign currency and therefore also admit any convex combination of
these two options. For simplicity, from now on the possibility of a convex combi-
nation between the two currencies is ruled out by assuming that consumers fully
switch to the foreign currency as soon as inflation hits an indifference threshold.
Finally, when two money exchange points are available both consumers have
the same inflation threshold and substitute domestic for foreign currency every time
that π ≥ π1.
4.2.3 The financial sector’s investment problem
Each period, the financial sector’s problem consists in deciding whether to install
new exchange points or not. The maximum of installed exchange points is two and
each one has a real cost of installation of F ∈ (0, γy). Every time that a consumer
approaches a money exchange point, the financial sector charges a real fee of γy.
It is assumed that once that an exchange point has been installed, it does not
depreciate. Therefore, when no exchange point is available, ξ = {}, the financial
sector decides between not investing in any exchange points, installing one exchange
point at cost F , and installing two exchange points paying a cost of 2F . When there
is only one exchange point available to consumers, ξ = {A} or ξ = {B}, the financial
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Figure 4.2: CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION AND INFLATION
sector’s problem consists of choosing whether not to invest in a new exchange point
or installing it at cost F . Finally, when ξ = {A,B} the financial sector has no
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investment decision.
The financial sector makes its investment decision before the consumers’ cur-
rency substitution decision. Then, this corresponds to a sequential game in which
the financial sector moves first, deciding on the number of installed exchange points.
This in turn is observed by the consumers, who make their currency substitution
decision taking into account the availability of money exchange services.
It is easier to start by considering a one-round game in which the financial sec-
tor makes its investment decision, and the game ends with the consumers’ currency
substitution choice after observing the behavior of the financial sector.
A one period investment problem
Case 1. Initial state: no exchange points available ξ = {} The firm de-
signs its investment strategy by anticipating the consumers’ behavior under different
levels of inflation. If inflation is below π1, none of the consumers requires money
exchange services and the financial sector profits are Π = 0 when it decides not to
set up any new exchange points, Π = −F when it installs one new exchange point,
and Π = −2F when it installs two new exchange points. Its optimal decision then
is not to install any exchange points.
When π1 ≤ π < π2, only one consumer holds foreign currency when ξ = {A}
or ξ = {B} and both consumers hold foreign currency balances when ξ = {A,B}.
Then, the financial sector makes profits Π = 0 when it decides not to set up any new
exchange points, Π = γy−F when it installs one exchange point, and Π = 2(γy−F )
when it installs two new exchange points. Its optimal decision then is to install two
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exchange points.
When π ≥ π2, both consumers hold foreign currency as long as there is at least
one money exchange point available. Then, the financial sector profits are Π = 0
when no new exchange points are installed, Π = 2γy − F when one new exchange
point is installed, and Π = 2(γy − F ) when two ne exchange points are installed.
Then, the financial sector’s optimal decision is to install only one new exchange
point.
Case 2. Initial state: one exchange point available ξ = {A} or ξ = {B} As
in the previous case, when π < π1 the financial sector’s optimal decision is not to
install the new money exchange point.
When π1 ≤ π < π2, the financial sector makes profits Π = γy when it doesn’t
install the new exchange point, and Π = 2γy − F when it decides to install it. Its
optimal decision then is to install the new money exchange point.
When π ≥ π2, both consumers hold foreign currency as long as there is at least
one money exchange point available. Therefore, the financial sector makes Π = 2γy
when the new exchange point is not installed, and Π = 2γy−F when it is installed.
Then, the financial sector’s optimal decision is not to install the new exchange point.
Figure 4.3 depicts the relationship between the inflation rate and the number
of existing and new money exchange points.
Inflation, availability of exchange points and currency substitution Sup-
pose that inflation follows a stochastic process such that p(π = π) is the probability
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Figure 4.3: EXCHANGE POINTS AND THE INFLATION RATE
of inflation taking the value π. Table 4.1 shows the probabilities governing the tran-
sition between exchange-technology states when each state is given by the number
of available money exchange points. From the matrix it can be seen that, if the
one period game solved above is played repeatedly, a sufficiently high number of
realizations in which π ≥ π1 will lead the economy to a point in which both agents
face the lowest possible cost in order to access the financial sector services (that is,
both agents are located at distance d from a money exchange point) and in which
both agents have the same substitution threshold for inflation (π1).




complete substitution, CSR = 1 , denote the three possible currency substitution
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outcomes of the model. Table 4.2 shows the probability of each outcome under the
different states given by the number of installed money exchange points. When the
dollarization capital is at its maximum, ξ = {A,B}, the economy does not display
any partial substitution, and currency holdings are either completely denominated in
domestic currency (with probability P (π < π1)) or fully dollarized (with probability
P (π ≥ π2)).
Table 4.1: Inflation Probabilities and the State of Exchange Points
Table 4.2: Inflation Probabilities and Currency Substitution
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A forward-looking financial sector
Solving the financial sector’s investment problem when it takes into account that
consumers live infinitely and repeat their currency substitution problem each period
is cumbersome and the different equilibria depend on the stream of inflation real-
izations. For simplicity here I present two cases, one when inflation is between π1
and π2 in every period and one when inflation is above π2 in very period.
Case 1. πt = π
h ≥ π2 for every t Suppose the economy starts with ξ = {}. In
period 1, the financial sector has three options: invest in one new exchange point,
invest in two new exchange points, and not to invest.
If the financial sector invests in two new exchange points at t = 1, then it
makes Π = 2(γy−F ) in the first period and Π = 2γy in every period after that. So






where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the financial sector’s time discount factor. This value is greater
than that obtained when the financial sector decides not to invest at t = 1 and





2γy − δ2F , and
greater than that obtained when no investment is made in t = {1, 2} and both





2γy − δ22F and so on.
If the financial sector invests in only one exchange point at t=1, then it makes
Π = 2γy − F in the first period and Π = 2γy every period after that, so the





2γy − F , greater than those










2γy − δ2F , and so on.
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The financial sector could also invest in the first exchange point at period





2γy − F − δF . However, postponing investing in the second exchange point






Postponing investing in the second exchange point for two periods yields an even





2γy− 2F , and so on. Since inflation is above
π2 in every period, both consumers are willing to substitute and demand money
exchange services from the financial sector who each period receives real fees of 2γy.
This income stream is not changed by the installation of the second exchange point,
so it not optimal to incur additional investment costs.
After considering all possible options, the financial sector’s optimal investment
decision when the inflation path is {πh, πh, πh, ...} is to install only one exchange
point at t = 1.
Case 2. πt = π
m, π1 < π
m ≤ π2 for every t When the financial sector invests





2γy − 2F ,
greater than those obtained if the two exchange points are simultaneously installed
at any future period. If the financial sector invests in only one exchange point and





γy−F , greater than
that obtained if only one exchange point is installed in any period in the future.
If the financial sector invests in one exchange point in period t = 1 and in






(1 + δ)F , greater than that obtained if the two exchange points are separately
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installed at any two different periods in the future.
After considering all possible options, the financial sector’s optimal investment
decision when the inflation path is {πm, πm, πm, ...} is to install two exchange points
in the first period.
An example of the path of inflation and currency substitution over time
After the analysis of the problems of the two consumers and the financial sector
it is easy to think about some possible cases in which the co-movement between
currency substitution and inflation will not be the same before and after a period
of high inflation.
Think for example of a case in which before period T inflation remains at
πl < π1, then it increases to π
h ≥ π2 at t = T , and decreases to πm ∈ [π1, π2) from
t = T + 1 onwards. Assume also that there are no exchange points installed before
t = T .
Using the analysis described in the previous section, it can be shown that the
financial sector’s optimal investment decision when the inflation path is {..., πT−1 =
πl, πT = π
h, πT+1 = π
m, πT+2 = π
m, ...} is not to invest before t = T , invest in one
exchange point at t = T and invest in the second one at t = T +1. The second panel
of Figure 4.4 shows the time path of economy’s dollarization capital (the optimal
number of available exchange points).
The third panel of the figure depicts the time path of currency substitution
associated with the given pattern of inflation. Before t = T , the currency substitu-
tion ratio is zero in every period; at t = T , the financial sector installs one exchange
106
Figure 4.4: PATHS OF INFLATION AND CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION
point and both consumers are willing to use its services, so all money balances in
the economy are dollarized and the currency substitution ratio is 1. Finally, since
a second exchange point is installed at t = T + 1, both consumers are at distance
d from an exchange point, and an inflation rate lower than πh but greater or equal
than π1 is enough to guarantee that the currency substitution ratio remains at 1.
The main message of the simple framework presented so far is that, in the
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presence of fixed costs associated with the investment decisions of the financial
sector, an episode of high inflation may push the financial sector into action in
terms of expanding the economy’s dollarization capital, therefore reducing (maybe
permanently) the foreign currency usage costs faced by consumers and decreasing
the inflation threshold at which households are willing to substitute domestic for
foreign currency.
4.3 Conclusion
The framework presented here constitutes a step forward in developing a micro
foundation for the presence of network effects and dollarization capital dynamics in
models of currency substitution. The dollarization capital variable corresponds to
physical capital used for the provision of money exchange services, and the network
of foreign currency users is composed of the financial sector and those consumers
who have access to the financial sector’s money exchange services. Whether a con-
sumer belongs or not to the network depends on endogenously determined inflation
thresholds for currency substitution and on the endogenously determined optimal
level of dollarization capital.
The combination of fixed costs associated with investment in money exchange
services and consumer heterogeneity in terms of access to financial services pro-
vides an environment in which the relationship between currency substitution and
inflation is not linear. Particularly, the model is able to deliver asymmetries in the
relationship between inflation and currency substitution before and after high infla-
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tion episodes. Starting from a level in which there are no exchange services available
in the economy, a period of high inflation followed by one of moderate inflation will
push the financial sector to expand the economy’s dollarization capital, permanently
reducing the consumer’s cost of using foreign currency and decreasing the inflation
thresholds at which they are willing to substitute foreign for domestic currency.
A natural step for future research is to embed the mechanism explored here
into a fully-specified DSGE environment, providing a tool for a more comprehensive




Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Calvo stickiness in regular prices
Optimal regular price and price aggregators




























































Eliminating infinite sums in the regular price optimality condition
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The numerator and denominator terms in the right hand side of (A.2) have cur-
rent and forward looking variables. Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b,2005)
this expression can be rewritten in a recursive fashion by defining four auxiliary vari-






























































• Ptxat is the present discounted nominal marginal revenue of serving the HEC’s
demand at regular prices until the next price change.
• Ptxbt is the present discounted nominal marginal revenue of serving the LEC’s
demand at regular prices until the next price change.
• Ptxct is the present discounted nominal marginal cost of serving the HEC’s
demand at regular prices until the next price change.
• Ptxdt is the present discounted nominal marginal cost of serving the LEC’s
demand at regular prices until the next price change.








































































Now the first order condition for regular prices can be expressed in a recursive
framework and the firm’s optimal pricing conditions are given by equations (2.18),
(2.19) and (A.12) , and the expressions for P ht and P
l















1− θh(f, sht )
]
(prt−1)
1−ε + (1− ρ)
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and can be expressed recursively as
prt = ρp
r
t−1 + (1− ρ)pr∗t
Othe equilibrium conditions
Since not all firms are able to set their price optimally every period, symmetry
cannot be applied in the same fashion as in the flexible price case, and several
equations of the model need to be modified.
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+ (1− h)θl(ft, slt)c
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And the sht and s
l
t first order conditions are
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In order to reduce the size of the state space, the model is solved around a







In order to reduce the size of the state space, the model is solved around a







A.2 Looking for f in the data
The James M. Kilts Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business
has made available several datasets on weekly store-level transaction prices for over
100 stores operated by Dominick’s Finer Foods (DFF) for the 1989 – 1997 period.
The customer count file includes information about in-store traffic. The data is
store specific and on a daily basis. The customer count data refers to the number of
customers visiting the store and purchasing something. Also in the customer count
file is a total dollar sales and total coupons redeemed figure, by DFF defined depart-
ment (product category). The figures are compiled daily from the register/scanner
receipts.1
The average fraction of time at which a good is offered on coupon promotions
is calculated through the following steps:
1. Aggregate the coupon redemption figure by store and by week (all stores
with less than 52 time observations were dropped).
1The data is available at http://research.chicagobooth.edu/marketing/databases/dominicks/ccount.aspx
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1 if coupon redemption 6= 0




Then, the underlying assumption is that if a promotion is available in a given
week, then there is at least one person that takes advantage of it (alternatively,
at least one coupon is redeemed ). Therefore, it is assumed that if the coupon
redemption figure in a given week is zero (dt = 0), then no coupons were offered
that week.
3. Compute f̂k =
∑
t
dt/(number of weeks), the fraction of time that good k
was offered on promotion.
4. Compute f =
∑
k
f̂k/(number of good categories), the average fraction of
time at which goods are offered on promotion.
If the underlying assumption in step 2 is wrong, then f is a lower bound for
f .
Table A1 shows the results for all the product categories for which coupons
were offered at least once in the sample time range. Table A2 presents the mean
value across products and stores.
Table A.1: Fraction of Weeks by Department
Table A3 presents the mean value across products and stores when including
all product categories.
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Table A.2: Fraction of Weeks: Sample I
Table A.3: Fraction of Weeks: Sample II
A.3 The Firm’s Problem Under Perfect Price Dis-
crimination (PPD)
For simplicity, here I present the case of flexible prices.
































where ck,PPDjt , k = h, l are quantities consumed by consumers under perfect
price discrimination and pk,PPDjt , k = h, l are the prices charged by the firm.

















These same optimal prices can be recovered from the firms problem with price
promotions with sht = 1 and s
l
t = 0 when the firm chooses ft = 1. To see this,
consider the optimality conditions from the firm’s problem in the model with price
promotions solved in Section 2.1.2 are:
h
[
1− θh(fjt, sht )
]






















































jt + (1− h)θlf (fjt, slt)clrjt
]
(A.33)
when sht = 1 and s
l
t = 0, these collapse to




























from (A.36) prjt > p
p

























A.4 Monetary Model with Price Promotions: Im-
pulse Response Functions
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
Table B.1: Data Series Used in the Document
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Table B.2: Money Aggregates
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Table B.3: Inflation Periods
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